God and Absolute Morality (split from Abortion)

[Behemoth]

Also, In many different countries ethics and morality are generally determined by religion of the state.

Thus middle eastern countries lieniency towards jihad and/or other forms of violence against opposite views.

Correct me if i'm wrong.

[Kilarin]

I do not find slavery immoral. So now we have a split of opinions based on perception of trend dominated by majority of hands, no?

Nope. We have a disagreement about whether morality is based on an absolute truth, or just opinion.

It is completely consistent to say that all ethics and morality are illusionary. They they are just made up of peoples opinions and societies tendencies. This puts morality in the same category as fashion. So violating the rules of morality has the same depth of "meaning" as wearing white shoes in summer (that is against the rules, isn't it?) The punishment MIGHT be bigger, but there is no more MEANING to it.

What's inconsistent is to claim there is no such thing as morality, until we hit upon a rule that offends that persons sensibilities. For example, I engaged in a long debate on this topic in another forum. One person was busily claiming that there was no such thing as right and wrong, it was all just stuff made up in peoples head and there was certainly no obligation for anyone to follow any rules at all. They were VERY adamant about it. Then the topic wandered just slightly and came to property rights. Amazingly enough this same person suddenly became VERY upset. They said:

In my opinion property is theft, especially when you are talking about actual land. ... Property rights are absurd. We do not have a choice. When we are born we are not given a choice. We do not agree to participate in this system of ownership. It is forced upon us.

Which seemed very strange to me. Just previous to this the person claims there is no such thing as right and wrong, then here they are suddenly decrying the injustice of the system. THIS is inconsistent. Either there is no such thing as right and wrong at all, or all morality is based upon some absolute standard, an absolute frame of reference that applies to everyone everywhere regardless of their opinions or society. You have to be on one side of the fence or the other, straddling doesn't make sense.

SO, if you don't believe in right and wrong, then yes, you will not find slavery to be immoral, and there is nothing I can do to convince you otherwise since it is an internally consistent position. Ethics are postulates. You can argue from basic ethics to more complex ethics, but you can never arrive at the basics by logic alone, they just aren't there.

But now suppose that I acquiesce to absolute ethics. It's still logically possible that your rape example was either good or bad. I still wouldn't know a priori whether the rape was good or bad. I would have to investigate God's nature or try to figure out what he has commanded before I can know that. But until then, I can't rule out either as a possibility.

Investigating God's nature is certainly an important element in discovering right and wrong (If you believe that absolute morality is based upon God's nature). BUT, we believe that the sense of "right and wrong" built into us comes from that very nature. It is a warped and imperfect reflection of that nature, but in most people it is certainly adequate to let them know that hurting others is wrong.

God's nature is not arbitrary. You seem to keep coming back to the idea that we need to judge/compare God's ethics to some outside standard. If there is an absolute standard of ethics, no matter what the source, then there is nothing to compare it to or judge it by, it is the standard by which we compare and judge other things. That's what the "absolute" part means. It means that right and wrong come from that standard. AND that they really are right and wrong.

What WOULD you consider a self-consistent standard of right and wrong?

I've more than admitted that the slave owners' self-delusion is a vice in and of itself. But the object of this delusion is a matter of fact.

It is unethical to intentionally manipulate facts in order to mistreat others.

[Jeff250]

Which seemed very strange to me. Just previous to this the person claims there is no such thing as right and wrong, then here they are suddenly decrying the injustice of the system. THIS is inconsistent.

It depends which flavor of ethical non-realism he's embracing. Consider ethical subjectivism--ethical statements are non-ethical, factual propositions that can be true or false. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent about an ethical subjectivist making ethical statements, since these statements can be true propositions.

Investigating God's nature is certainly an important element in discovering right and wrong (If you believe that absolute morality is based upon God's nature). BUT, we believe that the sense of "right and wrong" built into us comes from that very nature. It is a warped and imperfect reflection of that nature, but in most people it is certainly adequate to let them know that hurting others is wrong.

I don't see how introducing ethical intuition helps the matter. Let's suppose that there is some relation between ethical intuition and God's nature qua ethics. By virtue of assenting to absolute morality, you still wouldn't know a priori if any given act is right or wrong. You would need to look into the matter, by either introspection or exploring God's nature. So it's still unclear to me how rape being logically possibly good in absolutism is different from rape being logically possibly good in relativism.

(By the way, you should be cautious here, since ethical relativism probably does a better job of demonstrating a correspondence between ethical intuition and right/wrong than absolutism does.)

God's nature is not arbitrary. You seem to keep coming back to the idea that we need to judge/compare God's ethics to some outside standard. If there is an absolute standard of ethics, no matter what the source, then there is nothing to compare it to or judge it by, it is the standard by which we compare and judge other things. That's what the "absolute" part means. It means that right and wrong come from that standard. AND that they really are right and wrong.

But it's of no surprise that if you assume that God is the absolute standard of ethics then you can demonstrate that God is the absolute standard of ethics. The greater challenge would be to demonstrate how this can be possible without the assumption. Note, you don't actually have to demonstrate that God is an absolute standard of ethics. Just explain how it might be conceivably possible. Any old story will do.

A way to put this in another light is to lay it out like this, as I've done once before: If God's nature is the absolute standard of ethics, then it must possess authority, or else anything could be an absolute standard. But where does this authority come from? It cannot come from God's nature, because it would need this authority prior* to giving it. If it comes from somewhere else, then we have to abandon God's nature as the absolute standard of ethics.

* When I say "prior" here, I don't mean chronologically prior. I mean a logically prior. So explaining that God's nature has somehow historically started out having that authority doesn't break the circle.

I've more than admitted that the slave owners' self-delusion is a vice in and of itself. But the object of this delusion is a matter of fact.

It is unethical to intentionally manipulate facts in order to mistreat others.

But as I've said, when I'm talking about ethical beliefs, I mean to say that the object of the belief is ethical in nature, not that having the belief violates some ethical edict. The point is this: it's unclear if slave owners disagreed in ethical belief with us, i.e. if the object of their disagreement was ethical in nature. They may have just disagreed in factual belief.

[Testiculese]

I always figured absolute morality stemmmed from a poll of the masses asking themselves \"Would I want this to happen to me?\" I don't know anyone who would want to be raped, robbed, killed, oppressed...

[Kilarin]

The greater challenge would be to demonstrate how this can be possible without the assumption.

But I'm not certain you can. Authority is based on an assumption. it's a postulate if you will.

For example, I can say "God has authority because He created everything". Which certainly makes sense to me. And you can reply "But why does that give Him authority?"
We could keep hopskipping backwards, but you could always ask "Why does that give Him authority?" It's a variation of Zeno's paradox. Actually, closer to Lewis Carol's variation.

My point is NOT that I can defend that there IS an absolute behind morality. I think that is a postulate that you either accept, or you don't. Like the definition of a line or a point. You can't logically argue to it unless the assumption behind it (authority) holds, and that IS an assumption.

My argument is that UNLESS you make that assumption, unless you accept the postulate that there is some kind of absolute standard of morality, then ALL morality becomes relative and it becomes possible that the men who raped Mukhtaran Bibi were not doing wrong, that they were even doing right. If you find that you can't believe in that kind of universe, then it's time to start looking for the source of the absolute standard behind ethics.

[Foil]

In other words, you're not saying \"God is the absolute behind morality\" (although I would personally agree with that); you're pointing out the more general concept that \"there must be some absolute behind morality, or else it just boils down to personal or group opinion\"... correct?

[Zuruck]

I'm wondering how many of you have even had to deal with a situation like this? You people have no clue what the f.uck you're talking about.

[Kilarin]

In other words, you're not saying "God is the absolute behind morality" (although I would personally agree with that); you're pointing out the more general concept that "there must be some absolute behind morality, or else it just boils down to personal or group opinion"... correct?

Yes! Exactly.

I'm wondering how many of you have even had to deal with a situation like this? You people have no clue what the **** you're talking about.

I haven't been raped, no. Neither have I been ordered to rape anyone by a judge. But I don't see how that disqualifies me from saying that rape is wrong, even if a judge tells you to do it.

[Foil]

...If God's nature is the absolute standard of ethics, then it must possess authority, or else anything could be an absolute standard. But where does this authority come from? It cannot come from God's nature, because it would need this authority prior* to giving it.
...
* When I say "prior" here, I don't mean chronologically prior. I mean a logically prior.

I'm a little fuzzy on this particular argument. Why can't an authority based on God's nature come from God's nature?

[Jeff250]

I'm a little fuzzy on this particular argument. Why can't an authority based on God's nature come from God's nature?

First, I just want to set out some things on the nature of authority that I think are already clear, but it can't hurt. Something to note about that authority isn't a substance. When I say that I have some sort of authority, it's not the same way that I have a banana. I can point to a banana. I can show the space that it takes up. Moreover, if I leave a banana in a drawer overnight and undisturbed, I know that it will be there in the morning. I can't say any of these things about my authority. I can't point it out, and I can't show you the space it takes up. Morever, I can't acquire authority and "keep" it like a banana, say in a drawer. It just doesn't exist as a substance.

Authority is a property that emerges from the relations of things. I can go to sleep with a certain type of authority, and yet, even if all of me and my substantial possessions remain intact, I can wake up without it because of the changing relations of things outside of me. (Maybe I was fired from my job overnight.) It's this sort of relation that we have to keep in mind when we are talking about authority.

So why can't the authority of God's nature come from God's nature? One way to look at it is that it doesn't enable us to answer the question of why God's nature has authority. Why does God's nature have authority? Because God's nature has authority. But why does God's nature have authority? Because God's nature has authority. It's a vicious circle. One tempting way out is to think that maybe God just started out with authority, or maybe there was no time before God had authority. But I think that that is thinking of authority has a substance, not a relational property, which is incorrect.

This might seem like a trivial problem, but another way to look at it is that surely God's nature must have some sort of special property of authority to account for absolute ethics. Otherwise, anything could be an absolute standard of ethics. But I don't think you'd be cool with me saying that bananas are the absolute standard of ethics. Where does bananas' authority come from? Bananas! So this isn't really a trivial issue here. We want to somehow say that God has something that we can't say about bananas, without appealing to values or rights outside of God. But that doesn't quite seem possible.

Your question might also be asking something slightly different. Why can't God's nature's authority come from God's nature insofar as it comes from some sort of property of God's nature? It might, but this would be resigning God from being an absolute standard of ethics, since we would now seem to be saying that whatever that property is is the real absolute standard. This property would be identifiable if an argument of this line were actually fleshed out. Suppose it comes from the lovingness of God's nature. Well now it seems that God's nature isn't an absolute standard in ethics. It simply gets that authority from lovingness.

For example, I can say "God has authority because He created everything". Which certainly makes sense to me. And you can reply "But why does that give Him authority?"

I wouldn't though in practice, because that would already be resigning God from an absolute standard of ethics. He gets authority from some outside right that says that whoever creates something has authority over it.

My point is NOT that I can defend that there IS an absolute behind morality. I think that is a postulate that you either accept, or you don't.

Hmmm, that seems borderline ethical nonrealist to me.

My argument is that UNLESS you make that assumption, unless you accept the postulate that there is some kind of absolute standard of morality, then ALL morality becomes relative and it becomes possible that the men who raped Mukhtaran Bibi were not doing wrong, that they were even doing right. If you find that you can't believe in that kind of universe, then it's time to start looking for the source of the absolute standard behind ethics.

Even if you assent to absolute ethics, it's still possible that those rapists were good. Why does assenting to absolute ethics mean assenting to the absolute ethics that you want, where everything that you want to be wrong is wrong and everything you want to be right is right? What if there was an absolute ethical system, but it permitted the act that you're condemning? This is what you've failed to address, and this is why absolute ethics "fails" no more than relative ethics in this respect. Rape is possibly good in both absolute ethics and relative ethics.

All relative ethics introduces is the following sort of possibility: that even if you know that something is wrong in context X, then it could still possibly be right in context Y. But is there any real reason why this should threaten ethical relativism? It might be slightly less convenient in figuring out what is right and what is wrong, but so what? And like I've already pointed out, this convenience quickly evaporates once God (or some other absolute standard of ethics) begins issuing different commands to different peoples in different times.

In other words, you're not saying "God is the absolute behind morality" (although I would personally agree with that); you're pointing out the more general concept that "there must be some absolute behind morality, or else it just boils down to personal or group opinion"... correct?

This seems like one step away from an "appeal to consequences." Suppose we grant that to be the case. Then what?

I also think that it fails to take into account ethical relativism. Ethical relativism does not reduce to something like that whatever a culture thinks is right is actually right. It just says that the good is relative to a context of judgment (like a culture).

[Lothar]

Jeff, can you state explicitly which of these you believe (or, if neither, give sufficient detail for me to understand your actual belief):
1) ethics are situational, but real -- there is true rightness and wrongness in a given situation (which do not necessarily need to be 100% attainable), but different rightness and wrongness in a different situation.
2) ethics are opinion -- in a given situation, there's no true, overriding right and wrong, only right and wrong as judged by individuals or cultures

You seem to be arguing in favor of something resembling #1, and dismissing arguments against #2 as irrelevant. But I want to be sure you don't play some sort of sneaky ninja trick by arguing #1 and then concluding #2. Are you willing to state your opposition to #2?

why can't the authority of God's nature come from God's nature? One way to look at it is that it doesn't enable us to answer the question of why God's nature has authority.... It's a vicious circle.

You can break ANY system by asking "why" one more time. Whether it's "you need evidence for every belief" or "you can trust your senses" or "God is the absolute authority", any five-year-old can keep asking "why" over and over again and eventually frustrate you. (And, any parent can tell you, eventually the only sensible answer left is "that's just the way it is.")

You've presented, as an axiom of your belief system, that there has to be an external answer to the "why" of authority. Now, I can't tell you why God has authority by appeal to a broader principle (and even if I could, I couldn't tell you why that broader principle was absolute without further appeal.) To you, this leads to the conclusion that God cannot have absolute authority. To me, it leads to the rejection of the premise that there must be an external answer.

So, that's my answer: I reject your premise.

If I may be permitted to play the same game, let me simply ask: why is your premise valid? What a priori reason do you have for me to accept the premise that true authority must have a priori reasoning behind it?

I claim that God's authority simply is. He's the Creator and is ultimately powerful over all things (but this is not an appeal to the principle "creators have authority"; it's just a recognition of His creatorness alongside his authority.) And I submit that every principle by which we evaluate His authority is a result of who He is and how He created the universe -- rather than appealing to higher principles as a priori reasoning, I appeal to the same principles as evidence: they are derived from His character; they are results, not axioms. The existance of such principles does not JUSTIFY or ESTABLISH God's authority, but rather, they DEMONSTRATE God's authority.

Where does bananas' authority come from? Bananas!

Whatever authority bananas have comes from the nature and capabilities of bananas. I have no problem granting that.

I can't point to any higher principle or any action on the part of bananas that demonstrates the existance of any particular type of bananauthority, though.

My argument is that UNLESS you make that assumption... then ALL morality becomes relative and it becomes possible that the men who raped Mukhtaran Bibi were not doing wrong, that they were even doing right.

Even if you assent to absolute ethics, it's still possible that those rapists were good.

Theoretically possible, yes. It's theoretically possible that there could exist a universe in which ethics are not absolute, and it's theoretically possible that there could exist a universe in which there are absolute ethics in which "those rapists were good". But any time we're discussing ethics, there's an implicit assumption: that "ethics" are a real concept within our universe.

Personally, I don't argue that ethics are absolute. I argue that values are absolute, and ethics are derived from values -- which makes them inherently contextual. Even given an absolute source, different situations place different constraints on how values can be upheld; because ethics depend on relations between things, they must be situational. If that's all you mean by ethical relativism -- that ethics depend on situations -- then I agree with you (though I may have reached that conclusion from a different direction.)

Now, it's possible that God could dictate values in such a way that the specific rape referenced is good. This seems to be your key argument -- even with an absolute source, that source COULD permit a system that seems abhorent to us. I agree. But, God's system of values is not theoretical; in the actual existing system, that particular rape was wrong. (I suspect that in God's actual system, all rape is wrong. But there may yet be some bizarre situation I hadn't considered.) This, of course, flies in the face of type-2 ethical relativism, which that says there is no "right" and "wrong" in a given situation.

[Kilarin]

Excellently put Lothar!

I don't argue that ethics are absolute. I argue that values are absolute, and ethics are derived from values -- which makes them inherently contextual.

You are absolutely correct. I should watch my terms more closely. That's what I meant, but it's not at all what I said. There is such a thing as a real right and wrong, individual actions are right and wrong depending upon the context in which they appear. Cutting off a man's arm is wrong when you do it because you hate him, but it's right when you do it because it has gone gangrenous.

Thank you, your points are clear and concise.

[Jeff250]

edit: Let's see if breaking up my post can get around the crappy debug error. edit#2: yay.

Jeff, can you state explicitly which of these you believe (or, if neither, give sufficient detail for me to understand your actual belief):
1) ethics are situational, but real -- there is true rightness and wrongness in a given situation (which do not necessarily need to be 100% attainable), but different rightness and wrongness in a different situation.
2) ethics are opinion -- in a given situation, there's no true, overriding right and wrong, only right and wrong as judged by individuals or cultures

You seem to be arguing in favor of something resembling #1, and dismissing arguments against #2 as irrelevant. But I want to be sure you don't play some sort of sneaky ninja trick by arguing #1 and then concluding #2. Are you willing to state your opposition to #2?

I've been defending many different ethical theories in opposition to absolutism, including both #1 (as it is set out at the bottom of this post (edit: bottom of second post)) and something like #2, so it's not very surprising that it would be unclear which one I personally espoused. It was never my intent to say.

Personally, I don't think that the good exists in the platonic sense. The good doesn't exist just like the blue doesn't exist just like the funny (or teh funnay) doesn't exist. It really doesn't make sense to me to think of it as existing nominally like that.

But still, even without an absolute standard of blue out there, we can say things like, "The sky is blue," with these being true propositions. I think that this reveals another facet of truth besides objective truth--namely intersubjective truth--that we can use to describe the truth of some kinds of propositions. I believe that intersubjective truth can be used to understand how ethical statements can be true ethical propositions.

But I'm still willing to defend other ethical views, especially absolutist attacks against them.

[Jeff250]

If I may be permitted to play the same game, let me simply ask: why is your premise valid? What a priori reason do you have for me to accept the premise that true authority must have a priori reasoning behind it?

Why should there necessarily be a reason for God to have authority? Let's suppose there isn't. It's still fair to level the criticism that God has authority for no reason or that God is the absolute standard of ethics for no reason or even that the good is arbitrary. If this is the theist position, then we could have agreed three pages ago.

Also, it seems as though if we accept this explanation of God's authority, that God can have ethical authority for no reason, then it also seems as though that we could accept that bananas have ethical bananauthority for no reason. Granted, we don't see any demonstrations of bananauthority like you suppose we do of God's authority, but this is just an empirical matter that wouldn't necessarily threaten bananauthority. Don't we want to say that God has authority and a banana does not for a reason other than just that God has authority and a banana does not?

But that aside, I still think that it does make sense to ask why something has authority. Authority is not a substance. It does not exist in and of itself. It's not self-contained. It's a property that emerges from the relations of other objects. So we can always ask why something has authority.

Theoretically possible, yes. It's theoretically possible that there could exist a universe in which ethics are not absolute, and it's theoretically possible that there could exist a universe in which there are absolute ethics in which "those rapists were good". But any time we're discussing ethics, there's an implicit assumption: that "ethics" are a real concept within our universe.

Yes, but understand though where I'm coming from--I don't mean that to be criticism against absolute ethics. I just mean to show that it can't be used to criticize relative ethics in favor of absolute ethics, because absolute ethics falls under a similar criticism.

But I don't understand what you mean by: "But any time we're discussing ethics, there's an implicit assumption: that 'ethics' are a real concept within our universe." First, I deny that this is empirically true. Second, something like rape being good doesn't seem to contradict the existence of ethics. Ethics could exist and just say that rape is good, so it's possible that rape is good in an absolute system just as it is in a relative system.

Even given an absolute source, different situations place different constraints on how values can be upheld; because ethics depend on relations between things, they must be situational. If that's all you mean by ethical relativism -- that ethics depend on situations -- then I agree with you (though I may have reached that conclusion from a different direction.)

The way that ethical relativism differs from theories that are relative to the situation is that, according to ethical relativism, ethics are relative to the context of judgment. So, while the situation might determine ethics, so would the context from which the situation is being judged. Different flavors of relativism say different things about the kinds of contexts that can determine ethics, such as cultural context or personal context or perhaps a combination of the two.

[Foil]

Authority is a property that emerges from the relations of things.
...
We want to somehow say that God has something that we can't say about bananas, without appealing to values or rights outside of God.
...
I still think that it does make sense to ask why something has authority.
...
Don't we want to say that God has authority and a banana does not for a reason other than just that God has authority and a banana does not?

Agreed, on all the above points.

I believe I would answer like the following:

The reason we can say God has authority follows from your definition of authority as relational. That relation follows from an aspect of God's nature: his position as creator.

You may say, "But then you're pointing to God's creatorship as the logical source of the authority, not God himself." True! And I don't have a problem with that.

In other words, we're not saying God has authority by "being God" or "just because"; it follows logically:

1. "God is the creator" (defined by his nature)
2. "the creator has authority" (defined by the relational quality of creatorship)
=>
"God has authority"

The same can't be said of bananas.

[Jeff250]

1. "God is the creator" (defined by his nature)
2. "the creator has authority" (defined by the relational quality of creatorship)
=>
"God has authority"

The reason we can say God has authority follows from your definition of authority as relational. That relation follows from an aspect of God's nature: his position as creator.

You may say, "But then you're pointing to God's creatorship as the logical source of the authority, not God himself." True! And I don't have a problem with that.

Where some might see a problem with this is when you say "the creator has authority." This has the purport of being some sort of right, one that exists independent of God and that serves as the source of God's authority. So if our goal was to show that no values or rights exist outside of God, then it doesn't seem like we've hit the mark. But if we're willing to allow one, then this works out. But something to consider if we take this approach--if this right exists outside of God, then might others as well?

[Lothar]

it's not very surprising that it would be unclear which one I personally espoused. It was never my intent to say.

This is why I wanted to have you state it explicitly. I find the discussion is far more satisfying when I can evaluate coherent ideas and not just unrelated arguments and veiled propositions. I find it's helpful when I know whether someone is presenting an alternative they believe, or merely presenting a criticism of someone else's statements. That way, I know what statements I need to be looking at as relating to a coherent whole and which I can safely treat in isolation. It's a matter of clarity, and lack of clarity (while it can be an effective shield from criticism) is generally a bad thing.

The good doesn't exist just like the blue doesn't exist just like the funny doesn't exist.... [but] we can say things like, "The sky is blue," with these being true propositions.

Are you referring to ethical propositions of the type "action X in situation Y was right/wrong/good/bad"? That is, ethical propositions regarding specific actions and situations can be true? Would you agree that the statement's truth is due to the statement itself, and not merely a property bestowed on it by an evaluator? If so, I would place this within my statement #1 -- ethics are situational, but real.

according to ethical relativism, ethics are relative to the context of judgment. So, while the situation might determine ethics, so would the context from which the situation is being judged.

This would seem to be more in line with relativism type #2 -- judgements of "right" and "wrong" are valid only for the person and/or culture making the judgement. Ethical statements in this case are not true or false, merely agreed with or not.

Were you presenting this as a position you believe, or merely as a description of type-2 ethical relativism? Did I correctly understand your earlier statement? Can you reconcile these statements for me, please?

I don't understand what you mean by: "But any time we're discussing ethics, there's an implicit assumption: that 'ethics' are a real concept within our universe.".... rape being good doesn't seem to contradict the existence of ethics.

Restated: when discussing either absolute or type-1 relative ethics, the specifics are relevant. While we can't say that rape is wrong in ALL absolute systems or ALL type-1 relative systems, we can say that a specific rape was wrong (or right) in a given, specific system.

The "rape" argument shows that some absolute systems and some type-1 relative systems can lead to rape being declared good, which leads me to reject those specific systems while acknowledging that other systems of those types may still be acceptable. But, it shows that all type-2 relative systems are unable to declare that particular rape bad, which leads me to categorically reject type-2 relative ethics as completely unacceptable (not "logically incoherent", merely "unacceptable".) You've stated that the "rape" example is just as big a problem for absolute ethics as for relative ethics, but it turns out to be a much bigger problem for type-2 relative ethics than either of the other types. (Being clearer on which type of ethics you're defending, and others being clearer on which type they're attacking, would do wonders for this conversation!)

It's still fair to level the criticism that God has authority for no reason or that God is the absolute standard of ethics for no reason or even that the good is arbitrary.... we could accept that bananas have ethical bananauthority for no reason.

I don't view most of those as "criticisms", merely "observations". There's no prior principle by which God can properly claim authority? Yep, true. Bananauthority isn't logically threatened? Yep, true. Good is arbitrary? It's contingent on who God is, so it's exactly as arbitrary as God's nature. In order to make those into valid criticisms, you need to give good reason why God's authority NEEDS an external reason behind it, why bananauthority NEEDS to be logially and a priori rejectable, or why good NEEDS to be its own universal property apart from God. In other words, these don't bring up logical problems, but rather, emotional or empirical problems. (Similarly, type-2 relative ethics' inability to declare a specific rape as "wrong" is not a logical problem, but an emotional one -- I have an aversion to such an ethical system.)

I have no emotional aversion to there being no external/prior reason for God's authority. I have no problem with bananauthority being a logical possibility. I have no problem with good being defined by God's nature. *shrug* YMMV though.

Authority is ... a property that emerges from the relations of other objects.

I wouldn't say it emerges from the relations. I'd say it's inherent in the relations. God's authority is inherent in His relationship with the universe -- He has complete power over it; He created it; He designed it and structured it and defined it. God's relationship with creation is what it is, and authority is a property of that relationship. It doesn't come from some pre-existing principle higher than God; it simply is inherent in the God-creation relationship.

EDIT:

when you say "the creator has authority." This has the purport of being some sort of right, one that exists independent of God

Insisting upon it doesn't make it so.

If, as you said, authority is a relational property, it doesn't need to rest on a "right... independent of God". It can simply be a property.

[Jeff250]

Are you referring to ethical propositions of the type "action X in situation Y was right/wrong/good/bad"? That is, ethical propositions regarding specific actions and situations can be true?

Yes.

Would you agree that the statement's truth is due to the statement itself, and not merely a property bestowed on it by an evaluator?

No, I would argue that the statement's truth is due to both the content of the statement and also something that humans bring to the table. The objective facts of the matter and subjective human experience meet half way.

This would seem to be more in line with relativism type #2 -- judgements of "right" and "wrong" are valid only for the person and/or culture making the judgement. Ethical statements in this case are not true or false, merely agreed with or not.

Were you presenting this as a position you believe, or merely as a description of type-2 ethical relativism? Did I correctly understand your earlier statement? Can you reconcile these statements for me, please?

I was setting out ethical relativism according to how the term is formally used, i.e. to how I use it and to how other people who formally discuss ethics use it. The term isn't used to just imply situational relativism, i.e. killing can be wrong in one situation but right in another, which most ethical theories include. It's used to say that ethical judgments are also relative to the context that one is making them from.

It's not a view that I personally espouse, and I wouldn't put it into any of your categories. It might be forcable into #1 with some caveats, like that ethical judgment is ultimately relative to context of judgment. But it's certainly not #2--ethical relativism doesn't necessarily reduce to whatever somebody or whatever some culture thinks is right is right. Ethical relativism, in general, would allow something to be wrong for a culture in a certain cultural context even if everyone thought that it was right. For another culture in another cultural context, they might think it was right and be correct.

In order to make those into valid criticisms, you need to give good reason why God's authority NEEDS an external reason behind it, why bananauthority NEEDS to be logially and a priori rejectable, or why good NEEDS to be its own universal property apart from God. In other words, these don't bring up logical problems, but rather, emotional or empirical problems.

I would add aesthetic problems to the list as well (i.e. problems of ickiness or ugliness of a theory). But I don't think that a criticism has to be logical in nature. The ugliness of a theory is a criticism.

I wouldn't say it emerges from the relations. I'd say it's inherent in the relations. God's authority is inherent in His relationship with the universe -- He has complete power over it; He created it; He designed it and structured it and defined it. God's relationship with creation is what it is, and authority is a property of that relationship. It doesn't come from some pre-existing principle higher than God; it simply is inherent in the God-creation relationship.

I was describing authority in general. Do you think that the kind of authority that God has is anything like the authority that people have or like the way that we generally use the word?

I'm having trouble understanding your conception of God's authority here. For example, you say that God's authority is inherent in his complete power over the universe. But what exactly do you mean by this? Is having power over something just something that you would expect from somebody with authority, so you're saying that, provided that God has power over the universe, this matches your expectations of God's authority? Let's suppose that God has power over the universe. How would we see that his authority is inherent in it?

[Zuruck]

How many people here that are posting volumes upon volumes have actually dealt with rape / abortion?

I like how it's being broke down into simple equation sets and that everything should be black and white and perfect in the end. I got to see how imperfect it all is and I reiterate...you all have no clue what you're talking about.

Have fun with this.

[Kilarin]

How many people here that are posting volumes upon volumes have actually dealt with rape / abortion? I like how it's being broke down into simple equation sets and that everything should be black and white and perfect in the end. I got to see how imperfect it all is and I reiterate...you all have no clue what you're talking about.

I suspect you just scanned the topic, because what you are saying here sounds rather horrific in context, and I don't think you are that kind of person Zuruck, so let me splain:

Abortion isn't actually the point of this particular debate. The example under discussion right now is a young girl who was raped because a local "judge" ordered it since her brother had committed the crime of having sex with a woman of higher cast. Several men from the village raped this poor girl and said they were doing something "right" because the judge ordered it.

I believe it was wrong, no matter what they thought, no matter what their culture told them. It was WRONG. Because I don't believe that values (thank you for the correct word Lothar!) are just a matter of opinion or culture.

So when you say that "you all have no clue what you're talking about." It SOUNDS like you are trying to say that perhaps if we had been raped, or rapists, we might understand how those guys could have been doing something RIGHT by raping that girl. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty certain that is NOT what you meant.

I THINK you are trying to say that someone who hasn't been raped has no right making a judgment about abortion in the case of rape. I disagree, but that's a stance I can understand. It just happens to be a previous topic, not this one.