If this were a movie, it'd be ridiculous...

[Nightshade]

...but it's real life and beyond crazy.

The FBI has responded to recent concerns about U.S. voting systems being targeted for cyberattacks as Election Day approaches, saying the agency takes the threat "very, very seriously" and is working to "equip the rest of our government with options."

FBI Director James Comey addressed the issue while speaking to government and private-industry experts attending the Symantec Government Symposium in Washington, D.C.

"We take very seriously any effort by any actor," he said, "to influence the conduct of affairs in our country, whether that's an election or something else."

http://abcnews.go.com/US/fbi-chief-resp ... d=41740869


SO...in the very unlikely possibility that Trump actually wins...they can blame the results on "Russian Hackers" and somehow justify throwing out votes. A safety measure to get Clinton into the Whitehosue.

[callmeslick]

what is beyond crazy is your spin on this story.

[woodchip]

We had discussions before about electronic voting machines being hacked. The only reason the news is reporting it is the Russians would like Trump in the White House

[Tunnelcat]

If Trump wins for some reason in November, with his current poll numbers, it would have to have been rigged by the Russians. Besides, they have the motivation. Putin likes Trump, not Hillary.

[callmeslick]

Putin is just doing the bidding of the monied interests that keep him in power. Trump owes those interests a lot of money. He's just protecting the investment they've made in the Donald.

[woodchip]

And there I thought it was Hillary and Bill who owed all the foreign interests for the money "donated" to their foundation. Silly me.

[Tunnelcat]

Trump has a very personal business relationship with Russia.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics ... story.html

[sigma]

Trump has a very personal business relationship with Russia.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics ... story.html

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ ... 016-214110

[callmeslick]

And there I thought it was Hillary and Bill who owed all the foreign interests for the money "donated" to their foundation. Silly me.

no, stupid you. They were donations, and no one has EVER suggested otherwise, except for the truly desperate. If you think Trumps entanglements are somehow similar, you are dimwitted.

[woodchip]

And there I thought it was Hillary and Bill who owed all the foreign interests for the money "donated" to their foundation. Silly me.

no, stupid you. They were donations, and no one has EVER suggested otherwise, except for the truly desperate. If you think Trumps entanglements are somehow similar, you are dimwitted.

You know I struck a nerve when slick has to resort to name calling. Sadly for you slick there are many more people who think as I do than you. Stop using your Dem response book for Dummies when you reply here.

[Ferno]

... like watching a child kick a hornets' nest, getting stung and blaming the hornets.

[callmeslick]

obviously, Woody is delusional and bitter, but we're used to that.

[Vander]

I'm worried about fraud with computerizing elections, which is a bit at odds with my stance on voter ID. The discrepancy stems from the resources needed to commit the fraud. The effectiveness of in person fraud is directly dependent on the number of people involved. It's decentralized. With computer fraud, on the other hand, a single person could theoretically tamper with any number of elections.

Basically, I'm worried that in 10 years when we're all using some touch screen black box to cast our votes, those votes will be at risk of manipulation by a small number of people, and we won't have any good way of ever knowing. I'd much rather keep elections low tech.

[vision]

Basically, I'm worried that in 10 years when we're all using some touch screen black box to cast our votes, those votes will be at risk of manipulation by a small number of people, and we won't have any good way of ever knowing. I'd much rather keep elections low tech.

I think there may be a way to minimize this if we make sure that all the code used for electronic voting is open-source AND the voting data is made public in real-time. Right now in my precinct I get a receipt when I cast a ballot. I can imagine a future system that allows me to enter a personal identifier along with my ballot so I can track my vote as the election progresses. Election judges and observers would have to submit a count of people for each precinct and that number would need to be public to ensure false votes are not slipped in. I think with enough people double-checking their own votes/counts, fraud would be very difficult. But of course, this requires a level of transparency in our government that we do not currently have.

[Top Gun]

I miss the ancient mechanical balloting machines that our county used to use. I was too young to ever get to vote with them myself, but it was a cool experience when one of my parents went in to vote and I saw this huge array of levers that looked like something out of Willy Wonka's elevator. I honestly can't even remember if the electronic push-button machines our county now uses even provide a paper receipt.

[Ferno]

We're still using an old style method, where we get a slip of paper, fill in who we want in office, and give that to an election worker -- where they drop the ballot into a box in full view of everyone.

[Vander]

I think with enough people double-checking their own votes/counts, fraud would be very difficult.

Individuals checking their own votes online would be next to worthless. The only way you would be able to identify fraud is if everyone double-checked and then communicated and tallied their results.

I just don't see how any computer system can be considered safe these days. I mean, we have state sponsored attacks that will flash compromised firmware onto your hard drive. We infected disconnected computers in Iran with malware that reconfigured CNC machines and then displayed false readings.

Open source software is all well and good, but doesn't prevent compromise. And you have to figure open source software is at the most optimistic end of the spectrum in terms of available oversight. What about the hardware? If we assume that's open as well, you have fewer people available for oversight from a pure expertise standpoint. Then you have to make the hardware. If you follow the chain of implementation down to getting a voting machine into an elementary school multipurpose room in the middle of Nevada, there are any number of exposure. Who controls the keys to sign the software? Who controls the software distribution infrastructure? Who's updating the firmware on the devices?

I'm hardly a luddite, but about the only way I would trust a computerized voting system is if the system itself didn't do the counting. You can have a nice, fancy, easy to use touchscreen to vote, but it should print out a readable ballot that I can review and drop in a box.

[vision]

Individuals checking their own votes online would be next to worthless. The only way you would be able to identify fraud is if everyone double-checked and then communicated and tallied their results. I just don't see how any computer system can be considered safe these days.

That's a good point, but considering how many people think the system is rigged anyway there might be more people than you think checking their results. Obviously my idea is very simplistic and I am in no way qualified to create a airtight system, however, I still believe computers are valuable tools. We just need to find the right application. It will probably be a gradual thing with electronic systems slowly introduced to reduce human error, then more complex systems tested in limited areas (maybe not even for public office but in another industry), then refined until we have something that works. You're right, we can never have a foolproof electronic system, but we might be able to make one that is more reliable than humans, and "secure enough" for the risks involved.

Also, keep in mind that in about 10 years from now we will probably be looking at a new class of computers and likely a new security paradigm. If your argument is that there is always a way to game the system, well, we have that now. It's only a question of difficulty. Can we make an electronic system more difficult to manipulate than our current paper tallies? Probably. How about a distributed system where every electronic vote cast at a polling place gets a unique identifier tied to that location and, once approved, is copied to other locations in a P2P type system that makes it impossible to add votes later on since all the copies would need to be modified? And the votes themselves can have a hash that is verifiable with third-party tools so you know it hasn't been tampered with? I guess when I am talking about "open-source" I am really thinking about defining a voting protocol that third parties can use to create tools for snooping out problems in the system.

It's an interesting topic for sure. I really like talking about it because I don't know much and there is a lot to learn.

[Jeff250]

Also, keep in mind that in about 10 years from now we will probably be looking at a new class of computers and likely a new security paradigm.

Why?

Can we make an electronic system more difficult to manipulate than our current paper tallies? Probably. How about a distributed system where every electronic vote cast at a polling place gets a unique identifier tied to that location and, once approved, is copied to other locations in a P2P type system that makes it impossible to add votes later on since all the copies would need to be modified? And the votes themselves can have a hash that is verifiable with third-party tools so you know it hasn't been tampered with? I guess when I am talking about "open-source" I am really thinking about defining a voting protocol that third parties can use to create tools for snooping out problems in the system.

It's easy to provide security if you give up anonymity.

[callmeslick]

Jeff has hit on the core issue: the anonymity of our voting, which I suspect the public will demand forever. This has been a fascinating thread to see develop, by the way......away from the partisan stuff and onto a hard look at real, large scale fraud risks. My two cents centers on the question someone put forth: can we develop a more fraud-resistant method than the old-school mechanical voting booths or paper ballots? If not, there is ZERO benefit to a conversion to either computer-based voting stations or online voting exclusively. At 61, I've now voted by paper ballot, mechanical, punchcard, touchscreen methods. I've seldom heard, from ANY of those(and I was a party rep in some of these cases, who sees any challenges presented) of any significant irregularities at all. I've also lived long enough to see a few larger scale frauds perpetrated: two cases of clearly dirty voter rolls(not purging moves or deaths) resulting in literally more ballots cast than living resident voters in a precinct, at least one of similar misuse of rolls and longtime non-voters suddenly casting several hundred absentee ballots. One of them might have swayed an election, the others didn't seem to, from the extent I looked into them. Thus, I think we can conclude that at the present we, as a nation, have an extraordinarily secure voting process. I would be extremely reluctant to rely on any method to replace the status quo that cannot ABSOLUTELY assure that it would be at least as robust. At present, I see no way that some modern systems can make that assurance.

[Vander]

How about a distributed system where every electronic vote cast at a polling place gets a unique identifier tied to that location and, once approved, is copied to other locations in a P2P type system that makes it impossible to add votes later on since all the copies would need to be modified?

Using a blockchain would be interesting. I have no doubt that a system can be devised that would address all my concerns except for one: I would just feel a lot more confident if my ballot is an actual physical item rather than some ephemeral bit. It's hard to rationalize confidence, but that doesn't make it any less important.

[vision]

Also, keep in mind that in about 10 years from now we will probably be looking at a new class of computers and likely a new security paradigm.

Why?

Speculation on my part. I think today's global climate is dependent on trust more than any other time in recent history. People don't trust their governments, businesses are constantly vying for trust of consumers, neighbors don't trust each others, even relationships between parents and children are strained in the information age. The most successful businesses and governments of future will be the ones who are the most trustworthy. I suspect the playing field will change dramatically once we break the silicon computing barrier. There is a lot of power there.

It's easy to provide security if you give up anonymity.

Agreed. But even today's election rely on non-anonymous election judges and observers. We just need to find the weak links in the election chain.

I would just feel a lot more confident if my ballot is an actual physical item rather than some ephemeral bit.

Bits are physical. Data needs a physical medium to exist. We just need bits that are unique and irreproducible so they can be counted like paper ballots. We may have to wait for a new technology though.

Good discussion.

[Vander]

Bits are physical.

01100100011000010111010001100001 on a hard drive may be the same pattern as 01100100011000010111010001100001 in RAM, but they are separate physical representations.

To inspect the accuracy of my printed ballot, the original data that I'm going to submit, I need only look at it to review it.

To inspect the accuracy of my computerized ballot, even the act of instantly displaying it on the screen, I'm already looking at a generations old reproduction of the original data. (which itself was merely a temporary construction) Each reproduction is at risk of manipulation. The entire chain of implementation must be inspected before I can verify that what is displayed on the screen is in fact an accurate representation of what I wish to submit.

[callmeslick]

I'm old, and not real tech savvy, so can someone explain why having available the data from your own vote means a damned thing. I mean, if there is wholesale result manipulation that could occur at the point of compilation, or the insertion of bogus data along with the legitimate data, or whatever. What am I missing? I'm thinking as long as we have an anonymous voting process, a certain level of obfuscation is bound to be built in.

[Vander]

What am I missing? I'm thinking as long as we have an anonymous voting process, a certain level of obfuscation is bound to be built in.

Thats what I was saying earlier, but with something like a blockchain database, (think bitcoin) your vote could produce a receipt that identifies the vote rather than the voter. You'd have a public transaction record to go along with anonymity. Local election officials could certify the numbers of votes cast vs votes recorded in the blockchain, and random people could check their own votes in the blockchain. With some out of band confirmation, you can can probably have some reasonable assurances of accuracy.

I think this adds a lot of unnecessary complexity and risk, though. It's technology for technology's sake. There would need to be a very clear benefit that I don't really see yet.

[Jeff250]

The reason why bitcoin works as an anonymous currency is because anyone can generate a bitcoin, providing anonymity, and they are computationally difficult to generate, providing scarcity. Voting is different because, although we still want both anonymity and scarcity, we want the scarcity to be one vote per eligible voter, not one vote per unit of computation or some other resource. How would a blockchain voting system guarantee that each eligible voter only votes once without threatening anonymity?

[Vander]

Same way we do it now.

[vision]

I think this adds a lot of unnecessary complexity and risk, though. It's technology for technology's sake. There would need to be a very clear benefit that I don't really see yet.

I think this is the best argument against. Lot's of good points all around though. It's fun to read this kind of discussion when you don't really have a position.

If I might sidetrack the conversation a little, I would like to see technology used for increasing voter turnout and voter education rather than the voting itself. I spent way too much time every election doing my own research on candidates and proposals. I would be good if there were more resources, unbiased resources, to help voters with the process.

[Jeff250]

Same way we do it now.

Then what is the blockchain for? Why not just publish a list of votes and corresponding digital signatures?

[Vander]

I would like to see technology used for increasing voter turnout and voter education rather than the voting itself.

I'm not sure about voter turnout, but there are some cool things that can be done with information aggregation. For example, this browser plugin will highlight people from congress and display who their contributors are when their names appear on a webpage.

Then what is the blockchain for? Why not just publish a list of votes and corresponding digital signatures?

Database distribution and public transaction logging? Maybe I'm just latching onto favorable features of a blockchain database when it's ill suited for the application. I'm trying to game out what I might find acceptable for something I'm ultimately against.