DescentBB

MD-1118 wrote:I don't see it as "magically leaving" your body or "reentering". I see it as spontaneously ceasing to exist and reemerging, similar to quantum tunneling, I suppose. The 'self' exists because all of the right pieces are in place - it's the pattern, not the parts, and if the parts are arranged in just the right way, then the pattern will exist.

That's certainly a self-consistent definition, but it just doesn't seem to jive with our intuitions about survival, especially when we start thinking about duplicates. I think that if your definition forces us to conclude things like that people are experiencing from two bodies simultaneously and such, then the concept has jumped the shark.

MD-1118 wrote:Holy ****, that is a very good point. I'm not at all sure I'd be comfortable giving a straight answer to that question.

It's also not a question to give too much thought to at once, else you might end up in a very dark place!

MD-1118 wrote:The difference here - and this is why I think it should be possible to actually create consciousness rather than "just simulating" it -

I don't think that creating consciousness is impossible by the way--I just think that it will require physics, not just a very complex program running on a very fast processor.

MD-1118 wrote:is that blowing stuff up with a nuke involves actually interacting with the outside world on a different level than thinking does. I can think and imagine and the only real physical effect it has is to shuffle around some electrons and chemicals, which represent the thinking and imagining in the first place.

I can't imagine that you would understand every physical effect that your thoughts are having! But even if it is just shuffling of electrons and chemicals, isn't that enough to create electromagnetic fields? Well sure. Does that have something to do with consciousness?

MD-1118 wrote:Can you prove that I or anyone else around you are selfaware consciousnesses like yourself? We could be simulations so good that you just can't tell the difference. For that matter, what's to say that you aren't a simulation that thinks it's a "real person"? How do you know you aren't?

With our present understanding, it's a difficult problem to test for consciousness, but the difficulty of the problem doesn't mean that we should abandon the concept itself and accept any convincing simulation of it. And if there will be a solution to the problem, the understanding will come through physics. I think the problem only seems hopelessly difficult if you reject consciousness's physical component.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:I don't see it as "magically leaving" your body or "reentering". I see it as spontaneously ceasing to exist and reemerging, similar to quantum tunneling, I suppose. The 'self' exists because all of the right pieces are in place - it's the pattern, not the parts, and if the parts are arranged in just the right way, then the pattern will exist.

That's certainly a self-consistent definition, but it just doesn't seem to jive with our intuitions about survival, especially when we start thinking about duplicates. I think that if your definition forces us to conclude things like that people are experiencing from two bodies simultaneously and such, then the concept has jumped the shark.

You mention intuitions about survival with regard to duplicates. It is entirely possible that the reason it doesn't "jive" is because there has never been any need to even consider the possibility so far. Many principles in physics seem counterintuitive at first, because there is no urgent necessity to consider them in everyday life. It's also possible that my idea is just plain wrong, and that in the case of a duplicate, there is some defining factor that separates it from the original and makes it different. One could say, for example, that the factor is spatial location. It exists at the same temporal location and it is exactly the same in every other way, but it is in a different place. The problem I have with this is that the reverse should then be true - a duplicate that exists in the same spatial location but at a different temporal location, and is otherwise identical, would not be the same individual - yet that would mean that this person would 'die' and be 'reborn' as an entirely new individual every planck-second! A single individual existing in two or more places at the same time seems, to me, to be at least as plausible as a single individual existing in two or more times at the same place when viewed from this perspective.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:The difference here - and this is why I think it should be possible to actually create consciousness rather than "just simulating" it -

I don't think that creating consciousness is impossible by the way--I just think that it will require physics, not just a very complex program running on a very fast processor.

MD-1118 wrote:is that blowing stuff up with a nuke involves actually interacting with the outside world on a different level than thinking does. I can think and imagine and the only real physical effect it has is to shuffle around some electrons and chemicals, which represent the thinking and imagining in the first place.

I can't imagine that you would understand every physical effect that your thoughts are having! But even if it is just shuffling of electrons and chemicals, isn't that enough to create electromagnetic fields? Well sure. Does that have something to do with consciousness?

But there is a physical computational device containing the consciousness/simulation. It operates according to physics. It is a physical system, much like our body. Give it an appropriate range of sensors if necessary. Heck, give it mobility and a vocabulator. If just being able to imagine isn't enough to make it a consciousness, then give it the ability to do everything a natural human can. If it is functionally capable of interacting with its environment at the same level as a human, then there should be no issues, correct?

Again, I'll reference the Ship of Theseus. Suppose you lose your arm in an accident and are given a mechanical prosthetic that is functionally indistinguishable from your natural one. You are still human, correct? Now suppose you lose your other arm and both legs, and receive similar prosthetics for those as well. Still human? Continue on in this way - replace your eyes with optical sensors, your ears with recording devices, and so on and so forth. At what point do you stop being 'you'? Does it ever happen at all? Or do you just become a human consciousness contained within a robotic body?

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:Can you prove that I or anyone else around you are selfaware consciousnesses like yourself? We could be simulations so good that you just can't tell the difference. For that matter, what's to say that you aren't a simulation that thinks it's a "real person"? How do you know you aren't?

With our present understanding, it's a difficult problem to test for consciousness, but the difficulty of the problem doesn't mean that we should abandon the concept itself and accept any convincing simulation of it. And if there will be a solution to the problem, the understanding will come through physics. I think the problem only seems hopelessly difficult if you reject consciousness's physical component.

But isn't that exactly what we are doing when we just assume that every person is an "actual" consciousness rather than a simulation? Haven't we just accepted ourselves as such? Where are the tests that "prove" that we are not simulations? How exactly is one proven to be an "actual" consciousness? This has nothing to do with rejecting any components, and everything to do with not even knowing what exactly it is we are looking for in the first place.

MD-1118 wrote:It's also possible that my idea is just plain wrong, and that in the case of a duplicate, there is some defining factor that separates it from the original and makes it different. One could say, for example, that the factor is spatial location. It exists at the same temporal location and it is exactly the same in every other way, but it is in a different place. The problem I have with this is that the reverse should then be true - a duplicate that exists in the same spatial location but at a different temporal location, and is otherwise identical, would not be the same individual - yet that would mean that this person would 'die' and be 'reborn' as an entirely new individual every planck-second!

I think you're abusing the concept of plank-second here. I'm the same person as I was one plank-second prior, even if I'm at a slightly different position, because I have continuously transitioned from the one position to the other during that one plank-second of time.

MD-1118 wrote:But there is a physical computational device containing the consciousness/simulation. It operates according to physics. It is a physical system, much like our body.

Of course the device performing the simulation exists in reality, but it must meet the physical requirements for consciousness to experience it. Just merely physically existing isn't sufficient of course.

MD-1118 wrote:Give it an appropriate range of sensors if necessary. Heck, give it mobility and a vocabulator. If just being able to imagine isn't enough to make it a consciousness, then give it the ability to do everything a natural human can. If it is functionally capable of interacting with its environment at the same level as a human, then there should be no issues, correct?

"Imagine" is a loaded term because it would seem to presume the consciousness in question, but if you simply take it to mean that it can output new ideas, then the question is does it experience consciousness? I see no reason to think that it is nothing but an accurate simulation unless you've taken care to physically make it conscious.

MD-1118 wrote:Again, I'll reference the Ship of Theseus. Suppose you lose your arm in an accident and are given a mechanical prosthetic that is functionally indistinguishable from your natural one. You are still human, correct? Now suppose you lose your other arm and both legs, and receive similar prosthetics for those as well. Still human? Continue on in this way - replace your eyes with optical sensors, your ears with recording devices, and so on and so forth. At what point do you stop being 'you'? Does it ever happen at all? Or do you just become a human consciousness contained within a robotic body?

Or perhaps the paradox of the heap.

I don't think that replacing my arms, legs, eyes, and so on with artificial components would have any impact on my consciousness. However, if you began replacing components of my brain with artificial components without taking into consideration the physics of my consciousness, then yes, that could harm or destroy my consciousness.

I don't feel like I'm particularly susceptible to either of these paradoxes though, because consciousness is a gradient of which there are many different states, so I can just say, for example, that with such and such change to the brain, you're less conscious without being forced to decide if that still counts as "consciousness" or not.

Your theory so far seems the most susceptible to this problem though in that you are forced to have a magical point of material dissimilarity at which "you" will no longer transfer to that body! I know, I know, you don't like when I use "magical transfer" to describe your position, but without magical transfer, is there any way you could survive your vaporization by the Romulans on the transporter pad? Or are you finally ready to embrace death?

MD-1118 wrote:But isn't that exactly what we are doing when we just assume that every person is an "actual" consciousness rather than a simulation? Haven't we just accepted ourselves as such? Where are the tests that "prove" that we are not simulations? How exactly is one proven to be an "actual" consciousness? This has nothing to do with rejecting any components, and everything to do with not even knowing what exactly it is we are looking for in the first place.

Our current naivete concerning consciousness may seem frustrating, but I would strongly discourage accepting a "God of the gaps" explanation involving hyperdimensional energy or abandoning the physical concept all together.

Jeff250 wrote:I think you're abusing the concept of plank-second here. I'm the same person as I was one plank-second prior, even if I'm at a slightly different position, because I have continuously transitioned from the one position to the other during that one plank-second of time.

How have you 'transitioned', though? Solely by merit of the pattern of your consciousness existing at both temporal points?

Jeff250 wrote:Of course the device performing the simulation exists in reality, but it must meet the physical requirements for consciousness to experience it. Just merely physically existing isn't sufficient of course.

And what are these "physical requirements"? Physical existence? Sensory input? Thought, emotion, and memory formation? A combination of two or more of these?

Jeff250 wrote:"Imagine" is a loaded term because it would seem to presume the consciousness in question, but if you simply take it to mean that it can output new ideas, then the question is does it experience consciousness? I see no reason to think that it is nothing but an accurate simulation unless you've taken care to physically make it conscious.

Again, how do you define it as "physically conscious"? Where exactly is the line between a simulation and consciousness?

Jeff250 wrote:Or perhaps the paradox of the heap.

I don't think that replacing my arms, legs, eyes, and so on with artificial components would have any impact on my consciousness. However, if you began replacing components of my brain with artificial components without taking into consideration the physics of my consciousness, then yes, that could harm or destroy my consciousness.

Weren't you just talking about the effects of consciousness on the physical realm? It cuts both ways, you know. For example, you seem to think that only tampering with the brain will result in a change to the consciousness. I'll be fair and assume you mean the brain stem and spine as well as the upper brain, but I still disagree on the grounds that tampering with a great deal of other physical systems in the body can result in altered states of mind and even awareness.

And what about people who have had lobotomies or other forms of brain damage resulting in significant portions of their brain losing partial or total functionality? For example, I had a seizure when I was very young that severely damaged multiple portions of my brain, including speech and motor control centers. I still have a stutter and a diminished sense of fine motor control. Am I somehow "less conscious" than a person with a completely intact and healthy brain?

Jeff250 wrote:I don't feel like I'm particularly susceptible to either of these paradoxes though, because consciousness is a gradient of which there are many different states, so I can just say, for example, that with such and such change to the brain, you're less conscious without being forced to decide if that still counts as "consciousness" or not.

I suppose that answers my question. But now we have a new question - at what point does 'consciousness' begin or end? How much damage would be necessary before I am no longer a person? And on top of that...

Jeff250 wrote:Our current naivete concerning consciousness may seem frustrating, but I would strongly discourage accepting a "God of the gaps" explanation involving hyperdimensional energy or abandoning the physical concept all together.

You'll note that I only said I think the possibility exists, not that I said that it is a fact, nor that I am abandoning the physical concept altogether, because I believe it is bad form to shut down any hypothesis on the grounds that it goes against "what we know". After all, according to pre-Copernican physics, the Earth was the center of the universe, and it wasn't until someone took a step back and said "I think maybe one of our premises was wrong and that's mucking with our conclusions" that we realised that the Earth was not, in fact, the center of the universe. However, I am also not about to claim there is a teapot in orbit around Mars that is undetectable.

Just that there could be!

Jeff250 wrote:Your theory so far seems the most susceptible to this problem though in that you are forced to have a magical point of material dissimilarity at which "you" will no longer transfer to that body! I know, I know, you don't like when I use "magical transfer" to describe your position, but without magical transfer, is there any way you could survive your vaporization by the Romulans on the transporter pad? Or are you finally ready to embrace death?

I am always ready to embrace death. And, if it comes down to that, I guess I'll just have to accept it. Many have gone to their deaths in the pursuit of knowledge, understanding, personal convictions, and inevitability.

Jeff250 wrote:Our current naivete concerning consciousness may seem frustrating, but I would strongly discourage accepting a "God of the gaps" explanation

Just wanted to reassert that I am not pulling the "We don't know, must be god!" card here. If there is a plausible solution that hasn't been considered, or worse, has been considered, but discarded due to bias of some sort, then I'm going to consider it. Granted, the more, ah... mystical it sounds, the less likely I will be to support it, but I think it would be just as imprudent and closeminded to disregard all possibility of an outcome being a certain way without proof as it would to accept it as fact without proof.

And for the record, I'm not talking about ghosts and demons and souls and **** when I talk about hyperdimensional energy. I mean something more along the lines of tachyons, I guess, which... doesn't really sound much better, I know.

MD-1118 wrote:How have you 'transitioned', though? Solely by merit of the pattern of your consciousness existing at both temporal points?

I think you're still misunderstanding the concept of a planck-second. It doesn't imply that time is discrete. (Or otherwise I don't see where the disagreement could be.) The reason I'm the same person at time 1.0, position 1.0 as I was at time 0.0, position 0.0 is because at time 0.5, I was at position 0.5, at time 0.25, I was at position 0.25, and so on, for each of the continuous, infinitely-many time instances in between 0.0 and 1.0, even if time 1.0 is only one planck-second.

MD-1118 wrote:And what are these "physical requirements"? Physical existence? Sensory input? Thought, emotion, and memory formation? A combination of two or more of these?

For instance, there are electromagnetic theories of consciousness, quantum theories, and so on.

MD-1118 wrote:Weren't you just talking about the effects of consciousness on the physical realm? It cuts both ways, you know. For example, you seem to think that only tampering with the brain will result in a change to the consciousness. I'll be fair and assume you mean the brain stem and spine as well as the upper brain, but I still disagree on the grounds that tampering with a great deal of other physical systems in the body can result in altered states of mind and even awareness.

That wasn't the point I was making, but either way, I don't think it's important for this discussion which body parts exactly are necessary for consciousness. Certainly the brain is a big player though, whereas your arms not as much.

MD-1118 wrote:And what about people who have had lobotomies or other forms of brain damage resulting in significant portions of their brain losing partial or total functionality? For example, I had a seizure when I was very young that severely damaged multiple portions of my brain, including speech and motor control centers. I still have a stutter and a diminished sense of fine motor control. Am I somehow "less conscious" than a person with a completely intact and healthy brain?

So just to be clear, you're arguing against the idea that brain damage can affect your ability to be conscious? I know this may have struck a nerve given your personal history, but all I can say to answer you is that obviously not all brain damage will affect your consciousness, and although as a person on the Internet I'm not qualified to answer your question, I will say that given my limited experience communicating with you, I don't see any reason to think that you would have.

MD-1118 wrote:I suppose that answers my question. But now we have a new question - at what point does 'consciousness' begin or end? How much damage would be necessary before I am no longer a person? And on top of that...

But of course any nontrivial definition of person is going to run into that problem, including yours.

For ethical and legal questions, we might want to decide on some place to draw the line, but I doubt that any magical line really exists.

MD-1118 wrote:

Jeff250 wrote:Your theory so far seems the most susceptible to this problem though in that you are forced to have a magical point of material dissimilarity at which "you" will no longer transfer to that body! I know, I know, you don't like when I use "magical transfer" to describe your position, but without magical transfer, is there any way you could survive your vaporization by the Romulans on the transporter pad? Or are you finally ready to embrace death?

I am always ready to embrace death. And, if it comes down to that, I guess I'll just have to accept it. Many have gone to their deaths in the pursuit of knowledge, understanding, personal convictions, and inevitability.

Good to know. But by "you," I meant the you on the Romulan transporter pad. Does he survive or die?

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:How have you 'transitioned', though? Solely by merit of the pattern of your consciousness existing at both temporal points?

I think you're still misunderstanding the concept of a planck-second. It doesn't imply that time is discrete. (Or otherwise I don't see where the disagreement could be.) The reason I'm the same person at time 1.0, position 1.0 as I was at time 0.0, position 0.0 is because at time 0.5, I was at position 0.5, at time 0.25, I was at position 0.25, and so on, for each of the continuous, infinitely-many time instances in between 0.0 and 1.0, even if time 1.0 is only one planck-second.

I'm not misunderstanding it at all, at least I don't think I am. To elaborate:

TOW, on Planck time wrote:[A Planck-second] is the time required for light to travel, in a vacuum, a distance of 1 Planck length.

TOW, on Planck length wrote:[...] the Planck length is, in principle, within a factor of 10, the shortest measurable length – and no theoretically known improvement in measurement instruments could change that.

So a planck-second is the absolutely shortest amount of time that we could theoretically measure, because any measurement below that would be so small as to make the difference between units indistinguishable. All this means is that we have no way of measuring the differences, and thus we set a limit on measurement at this point as a result. It doesn't mean that no possible smaller measurements exist. It doesn't mean that there are no discrete, definable phenomena or quanta at this point or beyond. It means that as of now, any measurement beyond that point would be arbitrary. This does imply that time is discrete, I think.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:And what are these "physical requirements"? Physical existence? Sensory input? Thought, emotion, and memory formation? A combination of two or more of these?

For instance, there are electromagnetic theories of consciousness, quantum theories, and so on.

The former is closer to what I think consciousness is, or rather, how it operates, specifically the (cemi) variant. And as far as replicating consciousness goes in that regard, it would appear that someone already has some ideas.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:Weren't you just talking about the effects of consciousness on the physical realm? It cuts both ways, you know. For example, you seem to think that only tampering with the brain will result in a change to the consciousness. I'll be fair and assume you mean the brain stem and spine as well as the upper brain, but I still disagree on the grounds that tampering with a great deal of other physical systems in the body can result in altered states of mind and even awareness.

That wasn't the point I was making, but either way, I don't think it's important for this discussion which body parts exactly are necessary for consciousness. Certainly the brain is a big player though, whereas your arms not as much.

I wasn't so much referring to your arms as your endocrine system, although I'm fairly certain that every physical input affects your consciousness in some way, which is why I've brought up virtualisation or artificial replacement of input repeatedly. No, I don't think a consciousness akin to ours could exist on a level that involves only a neural net program on a computer. I think you would either have to give it the same (or at least very similar) input as a human has, or trick it into thinking it has those inputs by simulating them (a la brain in a jar). True, your arms must not be all that critical to consciousness, because we see people without them and clearly still count them as people. My point is that your brain is affected by many external influences.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:And what about people who have had lobotomies or other forms of brain damage resulting in significant portions of their brain losing partial or total functionality? For example, I had a seizure when I was very young that severely damaged multiple portions of my brain, including speech and motor control centers. I still have a stutter and a diminished sense of fine motor control. Am I somehow "less conscious" than a person with a completely intact and healthy brain?

So just to be clear, you're arguing against the idea that brain damage can affect your ability to be conscious? I know this may have struck a nerve given your personal history, but all I can say to answer you is that obviously not all brain damage will affect your consciousness, and although as a person on the Internet I'm not qualified to answer your question, I will say that given my limited experience communicating with you, I don't see any reason to think that you would have.

You haven't struck a nerve at all, I'm just using an example to illustrate my point. And no, I'm not arguing against the idea that brain damage can affect your ability to be conscious - quite the opposite. I think any significant change in the system containing the pattern must necessarily alter the pattern itself. What I am arguing against is the concept that a significantly changed pattern is in some way "less" of a pattern. You seem to have this idea that if your stream of consciousness is 'diminished' or 'interrupted' sufficiently, you will no longer be you. At what point, exactly, do you think this would occur? Am I not the person I was before the seizure? Realistically, from a certain view, of course I am not - I was very young at the time and not yet fully developed. Physically I am definitely not the same. But that's not what I am asking. Is my conscious awareness, my 'self', the same 'self' that existed before the incident, or has it, too, been altered significantly enough that I am now a completely different person from who I was before?

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:I suppose that answers my question. But now we have a new question - at what point does 'consciousness' begin or end? How much damage would be necessary before I am no longer a person? And on top of that...

But of course any nontrivial definition of person is going to run into that problem, including yours.

For ethical and legal questions, we might want to decide on some place to draw the line, but I doubt that any magical line really exists.

By definition, any such line would of necessity be arbitrary.

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:I am always ready to embrace death. And, if it comes down to that, I guess I'll just have to accept it. Many have gone to their deaths in the pursuit of knowledge, understanding, personal convictions, and inevitability.

Good to know. But by "you," I meant the you on the Romulan transporter pad. Does he survive or die?

I don't know. I can't give a more honest and straightforward answer than that.

MD-1118 wrote:I'm not misunderstanding it at all, at least I don't think I am. To elaborate:

TOW, on Planck time wrote:[A Planck-second] is the time required for light to travel, in a vacuum, a distance of 1 Planck length.

TOW, on Planck length wrote:[...] the Planck length is, in principle, within a factor of 10, the shortest measurable length – and no theoretically known improvement in measurement instruments could change that.

[...]

There existing a shortest measurable unit doesn't imply that the shortest measurable unit is the unit of the universe itself. For instance, if I can't stop my stopwatch faster than 1 plank-second, it doesn't mean that the event I'm watching didn't happen at 0.5 plank-seconds. It also doesn't mean that I couldn't also stop my stopwatch at 1.1 plank-seconds.

(There's actually some discussion of this on the Wikipedia talk page for Plank time.)

MD-1118 wrote:I'm not arguing against the idea that brain damage can affect your ability to be conscious - quite the opposite. I think any significant change in the system containing the pattern must necessarily alter the pattern itself. What I am arguing against is the concept that a significantly changed pattern is in some way "less" of a pattern.

I didn't mean to imply that.

MD-1118 wrote:You seem to have this idea that if your stream of consciousness is 'diminished' or 'interrupted' sufficiently, you will no longer be you. At what point, exactly, do you think this would occur? Am I not the person I was before the seizure? Realistically, from a certain view, of course I am not - I was very young at the time and not yet fully developed. Physically I am definitely not the same. But that's not what I am asking. Is my conscious awareness, my 'self', the same 'self' that existed before the incident, or has it, too, been altered significantly enough that I am now a completely different person from who I was before?

Yes, because there was a continuous stream connecting then and now, and so it is the same stream of consciousness, and so it is the same you. As long as it is the same stream, it doesn't matter if it changes over time as long as it's still a stream of consciousness.

I think that your definition is actually the one that succumbs to this problem, since you say that people are their memories, convictions, etc., so if your memories, convictions, etc. are much different now than they were then (or even if they aren't, assume for sake of argument that they are), are you a different person now than you were then?

MD-1118 wrote:

Jeff250 wrote:But by "you," I meant the you on the Romulan transporter pad. Does he survive or die?

I don't know. I can't give a more honest and straightforward answer than that.

Even if the thought experiment wasn't enough to sway you to my side, I'm glad I've at least given you something to think about.

Jeff250 wrote:There existing a shortest measurable unit doesn't imply that the shortest measurable unit is the unit of the universe itself. For instance, if I can't stop my stopwatch faster than 1 plank-second, it doesn't mean that the event I'm watching didn't happen at 0.5 plank-seconds. It also doesn't mean that I couldn't also stop my stopwatch at 1.1 plank-seconds.

(There's actually some discussion of this on the Wikipedia talk page for Plank time.)

That was sort of my point, except that it wouldn't be "0.5 planck-seconds". I mean, it would, but it would also be, say, 5 sub-planck-seconds (or some other arbitrary name for a measurement that equals one tenth of a planck-second). The point at which we stop measuring is not necessarily the point at which measurement literally becomes impossible, but rather, it's the point at which it becomes undesirable from a subjective viewpoint. For example, if I decide to time you running a block, I use a stopwatch, which measures units no smaller than seconds (or milliseconds, if it's digital). I could acquire tools that would allow me to measure the time it takes you to run that block much more accurately, but I probably won't because I don't feel it's necessary. It's impractical.

That's way off topic, though. The point I was trying to make is that regardless of how small the measurement is, there will always be some change between one step and the next, some shift, or difference. How do you, for lack of a better way to put it, reconcile that difference and say "it's still me"? Which leads me to this...

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:Is my conscious awareness, my 'self', the same 'self' that existed before the incident, or has it, too, been altered significantly enough that I am now a completely different person from who I was before?

Yes, because there was a continuous stream connecting then and now, and so it is the same stream of consciousness, and so it is the same you. As long as it is the same stream, it doesn't matter if it changes over time as long as it's still a stream of consciousness.

I think that your definition is actually the one that succumbs to this problem, since you say that people are their memories, convictions, etc., so if your memories, convictions, etc. are much different now than they were then (or even if they aren't, assume for sake of argument that they are), are you a different person now than you were then?

This is exactly why I don't think my definition succumbs. I am definitely not the same person I was a year ago, or even five seconds ago, and yet I am. People change, it's just part of how we are. You might be the same consciousness that you were long ago, but the constituent bits that make you 'you' are not the same. Some of them may even be radically different. The same goes for me, and thus I conclude that an individual may be a different individual than they once were, and yet remain 'the same' regardless, and subsequently that it is not just the stream itself that makes me 'me', mainly because that 'stream' is in reality a large number of individual points arranged in a linear fashion, connected somehow (I say through the pattern itself, you say through... just being fluid, I guess?).

I suppose, then, that the 'physical' element required for your stream of consciousness would be for the abstract elements - thoughts, convictions, etc. - to exist over time, and for them to adapt and change and shift and interact. An added dimension, if you will, just like the problem of the heap.

Jeff250 wrote:Even if the thought experiment wasn't enough to sway you to my side, I'm glad I've at least given you something to think about.

You certainly have, and that's why I make these threads. It's always nice to have something with which to exercise your mind a bit.

MD-1118 wrote:The point I was trying to make is that regardless of how small the measurement is, there will always be some change between one step and the next, some shift, or difference. How do you, for lack of a better way to put it, reconcile that difference and say "it's still me"?

Because, again, even if your way of viewing me is through a 30fps camera, I'm not actually jumping around the universe at 30 frames per second in reality. In reality, I'm moving an infinitesimal amount at a time. If I'm at point X in one frame and point Y in another, then there are infinitely many points on my path from X to Y that I have also existed in. You choosing to only consider my positions at time in units of 1/30 of a second or planck-seconds or whatever unit you wish does not change that reality.

MD-1118 wrote:This is exactly why I don't think my definition succumbs. I am definitely not the same person I was a year ago, or even five seconds ago, and yet I am. People change, it's just part of how we are. You might be the same consciousness that you were long ago, but the constituent bits that make you 'you' are not the same. Some of them may even be radically different. The same goes for me, and thus I conclude that an individual may be a different individual than they once were, and yet remain 'the same' regardless

I might say that I'm a brand new person after a cup of coffee, but my caffeinated self doesn't hold a funeral for my uncaffeinated self, and my uncaffeinated self doesn't try to avoid coffee to stave off death. Although given the stubborness in the political debate on this board, you would think that people here thought that changing their convictions was equivalent to their personal death.

I won't deny that memories are very important to my identity, but I don't think they are essential for my personhood. For instance, there are some people with a medical condition that prohibits any long term memory formation. Or at least, I would say that they are people, but your definition of person might poke at that a bit.

MD-1118 wrote:(I say through the pattern itself, you say through... just being fluid, I guess?).

Your consciousness being fluid.

MD-1118 wrote:I suppose, then, that the 'physical' element required for your stream of consciousness would be for the abstract elements - thoughts, convictions, etc. - to exist over time, and for them to adapt and change and shift and interact. An added dimension, if you will, just like the problem of the heap.

Not sure what you mean by this.

Jeff250 wrote:Because, again, even if your way of viewing me is through a 30fps camera, I'm not actually jumping around the universe at 30 frames per second in reality. In reality, I'm moving an infinitesimal amount at a time. If I'm at point X in one frame and point Y in another, then there are infinitely many points on my path from X to Y that I have also existed in. You choosing to only consider my positions at time in units of 1/30 of a second or planck-seconds or whatever unit you wish does not change that reality.

Again, that's exactly my point. A line is composed of infinitely many points. Say you were to zoom in on that line - oh. I see what you mean. Maybe I've been overthinking this. It just seems so counterintuitive to me.

Jeff250 wrote:I might say that I'm a brand new person after a cup of coffee, but my caffeinated self doesn't hold a funeral for my uncaffeinated self, and my uncaffeinated self doesn't try to avoid coffee to stave off death. Although given the stubborness in the political debate on this board, you would think that people here thought that changing their convictions was equivalent to their personal death.

I won't deny that memories are very important to my identity, but I don't think they are essential for my personhood. For instance, there are some people with a medical condition that prohibits any long term memory formation. Or at least, I would say that they are people, but your definition of person might poke at that a bit.

I still have to stand by my assertion that people are their memories, convictions, etc. I'll amend that to be both memories convictions etc. and stream of consciousness, or as I shall call it, 'persistent linear existence'. And since the changes in a person's mind are (usually) gradual and possibly infinitesimal, that would mean that they are (usually) the same stream of consciousness instead of 'different' conscious states. Reconciliation!

And it's not so much that I think people who can't form long-term memory aren't actually people. It's that I think they are probably the closest to literally being the same person that anyone ever will be, because they change the least. I guess you could say they reset after a short time? I wonder if that counts as an interruption of their stream of consciousness?

Jeff250 wrote:

MD-1118 wrote:I suppose, then, that the 'physical' element required for your stream of consciousness would be for the abstract elements - thoughts, convictions, etc. - to exist over time, and for them to adapt and change and shift and interact. An added dimension, if you will, just like the problem of the heap.

Not sure what you mean by this.

A grain of sand isn't a heap, but if you add enough grains (the abstract elements) it will become a heap (the stream of consciousness). I certainly wouldn't say a baby has a consciousness, but it acquires one over time through memories, experiences, etc.

MD-1118 wrote:I still have to stand by my assertion that people are their memories, convictions, etc. I'll amend that to be both memories convictions etc. and stream of consciousness, or as I shall call it, 'persistent linear existence'. And since the changes in a person's mind are (usually) gradual and possibly infinitesimal, that would mean that they are (usually) the same stream of consciousness instead of 'different' conscious states. Reconciliation!

Or as close to an agreement as I think we're going to get in this thread.