DescentBB

roid wrote:

Aggressor Prime wrote:I'm not saying we make choices without regard to the physical world. What I'm saying is choice finds its origin not in the physical world, and therefore has the ability to make decisions outside of physical boundaries. For example, someone who is raped, burned, and just totally rejected by his parents and everyone else he knows while growing up has the ability to turn out to be a very normal and caring guy, even if physically that would seem impossible.

I'd say the person's empathy pushed him to want to protect others from the same fate he had (after he had discovered other people existed who did NOT have his same painful upbringing). Be more specific and i'll be able to tell you more. I would agree it would seem to be impossible for a person to turn out "very normal" with this sort of upbringing - if he is truly rejected by absolutely EVERYONE. It could perchance be possible to find an inner source of a coping mechanism inside the psyche - as a form of psychosis perhaps. But this would disqualify from the "very normal" category.
Give me more info.

Aggressor Prime wrote:Also, let me apply the test of the soul upon you. Are you aware of your own existence? Do you think animals are aware of their own existence? Do you think computers, devices that think on the same level as animals, are aware of their own existence? Can you confidently say "I am" or "I exist" without any doubt in your mind, as if you know that you have knowledge of your existence, existence being the basic statement of "I am" or "I exist" and not even going into I am human or I have a body or I am a creature of God or god or gods or whatever you believe or do not believe in?

I'm not sure how you're going to gauge anything from this, here goes.

- Are you aware of your own existence? yes
- Do you think animals are aware of their own existence? Unsure. I'd guess yes, in some form. Higher intelligence animals would be more aware. They all have innate self-preservation so something in them is striving to be alive and not dead - implying an understanding of the difference. A want of one, and do-not-want of the other. This might be the simplest incarnation of an "awareness of existance" i can think of - self-preservation.
- Do you think computers, devices that think on the same level as animals, are aware of their own existence? No, as far as i know they completely lack egos. I'm not sure we actually have a device that thinks on the same level of animals yet - do you have a source for this statement? But building on what i said above, if a computer is programmed with a form of self-preservation, then perhaps they could be said to be aware of their existance, i'm not sure.
- Can you confidently say "I am" or "I exist" without any doubt in your mind, as if you know that you have knowledge of your existence, existence being the basic statement of "I am" or "I exist" and not even going into I am human or I have a body or I am a creature of God or god or gods or whatever you believe or do not believe in?
No i cannot confidently say with no doubt in my mind, that i exist. I understand that i might not exist at all, nor the world around me. This pains my ego to consider, but i understand it is a true possability . ie: if some paradox causes the destruction of our unviverse and all time and space - i will not only cease to exist as in "die" - but will have never existed throughout all of time.

what's the prognosis? do i have a soul according to your religion? (is this an original religion btw? or is this based on a more common teaching i can look up?)

In regards to the first quotation, I am making the assumption that such a tortured man as this never developes a mind (psyche) that understands empathy. Moreover, he is completely ignorant (Socrates' ignorant as in not aware) of empathy due to his upbringing never showing empathy.

In regards to whether you have a soul or not, or rather if you can realize if you have a soul or not, I cannot determine yet nor have I convinced you. You connected self-preservation with the awareness of existence. I just simply can't see this connection in terms of animals. Let me explain. Self-preservation is the instinct to survive. It is encoded into the firing neurons of the brain to continue working in so much as it can continue working. There is a sense of holding out until one can hold out no longer. Am I correct in saying this? Is this what you mean? If so, I believe computers hold this same concept. Don't computers continue operating in so much as they are able to operate? Are they not following the software given to them to stay active as long as possible, granted no human shuts them down. When you hold a dog under water, doesn't the dog struggle to let lose of your grip so that he may live? In the same way, doesn't the computer in so much as it is able tries to resist crashing after a serious overclock? And must not the dog obey the ultimate command of death given by man when the dog is shot in the head? In the same way, doesn't the computer obey the ultimate command of man to shut down immediately once man pulls the plug? And if man decides to shut down his computer slowly through normal means, doesn't the computer stay active in so much as it can stay active until the internal software switches force it to shut down in the multiple stages that occur during a normal Windows shut down?

Now let us consider your doubt in your existence. Are you not aware of this argument we are having? Do you not reason what is and what is not? "I think, therefore I am." Take this statement to heart. How can you disprove your own existence if your very attempt to disprove it proves that you exist? You bring in the concept of the complete destruction paradox. Let us assume there are two planes of time, the time of now and the time of change. In the time of now, your perspective now is correct. You exist now and no matter what will always exist now because now is now and independent by it being now. In the plane of time of change, your paradox works. Then again, there has been no proof that the time of change has power over the time of now. Moreover, many Buddhists believe that the time of change is an illusion and the time of now is reality.

Time of now-a timeless time that focuses not on the making of choices but the understanding of the choices we have/are/will made/making/make. Past, present, and future have no relevance. This is the same perspective Christians take of God being a timeless being. He lives in the time of now. We still make choices, but by living in this state we make the choice at the same time we think about making the choice and at the same time we wonder if the choice we made is correct. This can be demonstrated in virtual worlds as a functional water fountain. A water fountain has an equation rather than a placement of water set in a certain order by time. This concept of a time of now connects more with the realm of ideas than the realm of the senses that the time of change takes.

Time of change-conventional concept of time. As we come to understand the timeless choices we have/are/will made/making/make in the time of now, we move forward in this illusion of the time of change.

Ford Prefect wrote:You see this is where personal opinion trumps facts.

You mean 'this is where personal opinion trumps personal opinion', right? Nobody really knows how the universe was created, and the thought of an object spontaneously appearing is as abstract as the thought of a supreme being spontaneously appearing.

Aggressor Prime i understood very little of that.
Everytime you reference \"Choice\" - it seems you are speaking another language. I do not hold the same views as you do on what \"Choice\" and what it represents. I'm not sure if you are making assumptions that i do understand why \"Choice\" is logically a supernatural thing.
I do not see at all why Choice has anything to do with the soul and/or the supernatural. I remember the concept of \"Even the Gods can't predict your Choice\" being in the Matrix - but i never thought it was a robust enough concept in the first place to bother integrating into my beliefs - so i dismissed it as poorly thought out sillyness.
I don't understand why you are taking it seriously - but you obviously are - so there might be something to it that i missed and maybe i was too hasty in dismissing it.

But to get me to understand you'll have to start by getting me to understand how Choice is a supernatural thing. Because i still do not understand why anyone would think that - short of taking the Matrix too seriously. Have you explained it sufficiently and i wasn't paying attention?

Is this based on more than just the Matrix movie? Is \"Choice is supernatural\" a Buddhist, Taoist, etc concept?


i think therefore i am. This is true. But how am i to know that this means i \"exist\" in the way we define existance? I could be a part of someone's dream - i could be a story written on paper - and \"roid thinks he exists\" is simply a part of that pre-writen story. I am not sure if i truly exist at all. I could say that i know i am information, but i have no guarentee of it's accuracy or authenticity, i and my entire universe (including you) could be the mad neuronal firings of some poor chap living out a psychosis - i'm not HIM, but merely some of the junk living in his head. I could be a simulation. Who knows how i truly exist - and if it would meet the qualificiations of \"yes, he exists\" by our current standards. Do i think i'm talking to you? Yes. If YOU think this means i exist, and you're the one asking anyway, then sure i'll take your definition and lets move on.
(I'm personally hesitant to give my ego such airs, i still struggle with the question of my existance, i remain prepared for the answer to be NO)

Our bodies do not make choices. Even the electrical signals in our brains do not make choices as much as a computer cannot make choices.

Computers can't think the way we do, however, if I put Paint Shop Pro in my Startup folder, it makes a choice based on my input or \"help\". Many of the wisest, most intuitive people in the world believe that the Soul is a part of God and at the same time a part of us. And its purpose, or what it wants, is to help us learn how to make wiser choices than we sometimes make on our own.

Some foreign element governs these electrical signals. Only this foreign element (soul) can choose.

If we, as human beings, cannot choose to believe that we have a soul, then the results of this poll (which proves that the majority of us do) would mean that this \"foreign element\" chooses to believe in itself. Hmmm.

Here's a thought:

Maybe we're all here by mistake, alone in the Universe, have no real purpose, and when we die ... that's the end.

I think not.

mistercool2 wrote:Maybe we're all here by mistake, alone in the Universe, have no real purpose, and when we die ... that's the end.

I think not.

That's why humans invented religion. We don't want to die.

Bee

Well Bee, I don't know all the reasons why religion was invented, but if one of them was because we don't want to die, that doesn't seem to be working.
I think the fear of death may have more to do with it, which is one of the reasons alot of us humans believe something other than - we're born, we live, we die, the end.

mistercool2 wrote:Well Bee, I don't know all the reasons why religion was invented, but if one of them was because we don't want to die, that doesn't seem to be working.
I think the fear of death may have more to do with it, which is one of the reasons alot of us humans believe something other than - we're born, we live, we die, the end.

And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die... I meant it that way but your right, humans have a fear of death and want to live on in heaven forever. I just believe in the born, live, die, end.

Bee

you mean:

John 3:16
\"For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.\"
KJV

roid wrote:Aggressor Prime i understood very little of that.
Everytime you reference "Choice" - it seems you are speaking another language. I do not hold the same views as you do on what "Choice" and what it represents. I'm not sure if you are making assumptions that i do understand why "Choice" is logically a supernatural thing.
I do not see at all why Choice has anything to do with the soul and/or the supernatural. I remember the concept of "Even the Gods can't predict your Choice" being in the Matrix - but i never thought it was a robust enough concept in the first place to bother integrating into my beliefs - so i dismissed it as poorly thought out sillyness.
I don't understand why you are taking it seriously - but you obviously are - so there might be something to it that i missed and maybe i was too hasty in dismissing it.

But to get me to understand you'll have to start by getting me to understand how Choice is a supernatural thing. Because i still do not understand why anyone would think that - short of taking the Matrix too seriously. Have you explained it sufficiently and i wasn't paying attention?

Is this based on more than just the Matrix movie? Is "Choice is supernatural" a Buddhist, Taoist, etc concept?


i think therefore i am. This is true. But how am i to know that this means i "exist" in the way we define existance? I could be a part of someone's dream - i could be a story written on paper - and "roid thinks he exists" is simply a part of that pre-writen story. I am not sure if i truly exist at all. I could say that i know i am information, but i have no guarentee of it's accuracy or authenticity, i and my entire universe (including you) could be the mad neuronal firings of some poor chap living out a psychosis - i'm not HIM, but merely some of the junk living in his head. I could be a simulation. Who knows how i truly exist - and if it would meet the qualificiations of "yes, he exists" by our current standards. Do i think i'm talking to you? Yes. If YOU think this means i exist, and you're the one asking anyway, then sure i'll take your definition and lets move on.
(I'm personally hesitant to give my ego such airs, i still struggle with the question of my existance, i remain prepared for the answer to be NO)

You want me to relate choice to supernatural existence and therefore I will. The natural world is governed by math. If I shoot a bullet, that bullet can only fly one way if I take into account all worldly conditions. If I have a single point of matter in its primal form, whatever that may be, whatever may be found at the core at the black hole, a singularity, and explode it by giving it a set burst of energy erupting at a certain position, the universe formed can only form one way. There is no such thing as randomness. A computer program designed to make random choices does not make random choices. It uses a counting program or some other means to make it look random. Everything in the physical world is governed by math, and anyone with any sense knows that math can only give you one answer, one solution. By that, the world is predetermined, considering there is no external element, an element not governed by math, an element we have come to define as the spiritual realm. But let us look back at the physical realm. Let us assume there is no spiritual realm. If that is so, then the world no matter what is predetermined. Whatever happens can only happen one way. This is different from the Greek concept of fate. While the Greeks saw one's end always ending up the same way, the will of the gods always becoming victorious, a predetermined world means that every moment is fate. Every moment is out of our control. We have no power ever. This means we can make no choice. Moreover, let us connect this element of choice to awareness of existence. By being forced to do everything by nature, we have no awareness. Everything is already predetermined including our thoughts. Therefore, our thoughts are not our own. We have no power over our thoughts. When I mean thoughts, I do not mean electrical impulses. I mean thoughts of the soul. These thoughts can only be identified with thoughts you are aware of, that you have control over. The one thought that you always have control over is the thought of your own existence. In other words, you are always aware of your own existence and you are completely aware of your own existence. This means that you know the basic statement, "I am," know as in understand it, and you cannot doubt it. What do I mean by doubt? I mean that while you can't grasp the idea of entire existence, you can't lose grasp of the idea of your own existence. In so much as I can't know everything, I can't stop knowing I am. This force preventing us from losing our unquestionable knowledge of our own existence is the force of life. Granted, I cannot know for certain if you exist. I can only know for certain that I exist. How can I know that? At its root, no words can explain it. But as I translate the words of the source into the words of idea, let me say: "I think, therefore I am." Notice the "I." This does not mean that I can apply this term of thinking to a computer because I am not the computer and therefore I cannot know if the computer is thinking. This thinking is of course on the spiritual level. There is know way to prove it, only for the self to know it for certain. However, we can use this aspect of a flowing time to show how we might come to realize that we know without doubt that "I exist." As I said before, the physical world is predetermined. Everything is already decided. Everything including thought is not one's own. It is already defined, already decided, and therefore stripped of any connection to any sense of self. If I indeed exist, exist on a level outside of the physical world, a level in which I can hold the thought (have the power to say), "I exist," I am not being constrained by the physical world's force of nature to give up this thought. All of our other thoughts may be forced on by nature, we don't know for certain. All I know for certain is "I am." Therefore, I have power. By having power, I am not predetermined. By not being predetermined, I am not of substance with the physical world. What substance am I of then? We define it as the spiritual world, and the self as the soul. I hope you can understand all that I have written here. I agree, Philosophy/Theology uses difficult language. But the language needs to be difficult to convey the richness of the message.

Aggressor Prime wrote:You want me to relate choice to supernatural existence and therefore I will. The natural world is governed by math. If I shoot a bullet, that bullet can only fly one way if I take into account all worldly conditions. If I have a single point of matter in its primal form, whatever that may be, whatever may be found at the core at the black hole, a singularity, and explode it by giving it a set burst of energy erupting at a certain position, the universe formed can only form one way. There is no such thing as randomness. A computer program designed to make random choices does not make random choices. It uses a counting program or some other means to make it look random. Everything in the physical world is governed by math, and anyone with any sense knows that math can only give you one answer, one solution. By that, the world is predetermined, considering there is no external element, an element not governed by math, an element we have come to define as the spiritual realm. But let us look back at the physical realm. Let us assume there is no spiritual realm. If that is so, then the world no matter what is predetermined. Whatever happens can only happen one way. This is different from the Greek concept of fate. While the Greeks saw one's end always ending up the same way, the will of the gods always becoming victorious, a predetermined world means that every moment is fate. Every moment is out of our control. We have no power ever. This means we can make no choice. Moreover, let us connect this element of choice to awareness of existence. By being forced to do everything by nature, we have no awareness. Everything is already predetermined including our thoughts. Therefore, our thoughts are not our own. We have no power over our thoughts. When I mean thoughts, I do not mean electrical impulses. I mean thoughts of the soul. These thoughts can only be identified with thoughts you are aware of, that you have control over. The one thought that you always have control over is the thought of your own existence.

purposterous! Our awareness of our own existance can just as easily be out of our control. There is no reason to make a distinction there - that our seeming awareness of existance MUST be some magical thing - that such thoughts could ONLY originate in some otherworldly "SOUL". It could be as biologically natural as self-preservation, altruism, and language.

In other words, you are always aware of your own existence and you are completely aware of your own existence. This means that you know the basic statement, "I am," know as in understand it, and you cannot doubt it. What do I mean by doubt? I mean that while you can't grasp the idea of entire existence, you can't lose grasp of the idea of your own existence. In so much as I can't know everything, I can't stop knowing I am. This force preventing us from losing our unquestionable knowledge of our own existence is the force of life.

Again this is false. Have you ever taken K/LSD/DMT? You can completley loose all sense of yourself, of your ego, of yourself as a seperate individual being. You can indeed "lose grasp of the idea of your own existence" - though you say it is impossible - millions of people prove you wrong.

Granted, I cannot know for certain if you exist. I can only know for certain that I exist. How can I know that? At its root, no words can explain it. But as I translate the words of the source into the words of idea, let me say: "I think, therefore I am." Notice the "I." This does not mean that I can apply this term of thinking to a computer because I am not the computer and therefore I cannot know if the computer is thinking. This thinking is of course on the spiritual level. There is know way to prove it, only for the self to know it for certain. However, we can use this aspect of a flowing time to show how we might come to realize that we know without doubt that "I exist." As I said before, the physical world is predetermined. Everything is already decided. Everything including thought is not one's own. It is already defined, already decided, and therefore stripped of any connection to any sense of self. If I indeed exist, exist on a level outside of the physical world, a level in which I can hold the thought (have the power to say), "I exist," I am not being constrained by the physical world's force of nature to give up this thought. All of our other thoughts may be forced on by nature, we don't know for certain. All I know for certain is "I am." Therefore, I have power. By having power, I am not predetermined. By not being predetermined, I am not of substance with the physical world. What substance am I of then? We define it as the spiritual world, and the self as the soul. I hope you can understand all that I have written here. I agree, Philosophy/Theology uses difficult language. But the language needs to be difficult to convey the richness of the message.

Your sense of self-awareness is just as much predetermined and a part of this physical world as your sense of altruism or language. A good illustration of this is by taking note of how powerful hallucinogens temporarily effect your ego, your sense of self. If your sense of self can not be effected by things of this physical world - then that must make hallucinogens supernatural pills!

Bet51987 wrote: And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die... I meant it that way but your right, humans have a fear of death and want to live on in heaven forever. I just believe in the born, live, die, end.
Bee

allrighty then

a predetermined world means that every moment is fate. Every moment is out of our control. We have no power ever. This means we can make no choice.

the frustration many people have with this sort of 'pre-determination' always eluded me. I am what I am because of my history, as it is ultimately reflected by my body and the neurons in my brain. The choices I make now reflect what I have experienced before. That is it what this sort of pre-determination ultimately means, nothing more --- what's so bothersome about it?

And then, as sort of an anti-dote, people propose 'chance' or 'randomness', but what is so appealing about this idea? I would rather be governed by my own history than by some random process ... where's the freedom in chance, where is the power in chance?

The only thing you gain by introducing chance is that nobody could ever predict your choices, but this is impossible anyways: the brain, the body and their interactions are too complex for anyone to figure out what another person will be deciding, let alone what you will be deciding yourself.

yes, i wonder if it is a frustration that someone out there might be able to predict your actions - and sort of \"control you\". Like a god - but with no guarentee of benavolence.

i think it comes from a starting point of belief in a god. So when confronted with the possability that you have no control over your life - the first thing one may do is draw on their God concept and think \"well... if i'm such a lifeless automoton - then that means that someONE must be controlling me - i'm just a puppet\". But this is not true - no-one has control over us. We are predictable - as long as no-one is predicting (ie: no god) then we are still effectively \"FREE\" - no-one is influencing us and controlling us.

i think that's the source of frustration ppl have with it. They assume that because we are absolutely predictable - that some \"big-man\" must therefore have absolute control over us.
Yeah, we're predictable like cars in a physics simulation. But no-one is behind the wheel directing us where to crash - we just crash into whatever.

roid wrote:

Aggressor Prime wrote:You want me to relate choice to supernatural existence and therefore I will. The natural world is governed by math. If I shoot a bullet, that bullet can only fly one way if I take into account all worldly conditions. If I have a single point of matter in its primal form, whatever that may be, whatever may be found at the core at the black hole, a singularity, and explode it by giving it a set burst of energy erupting at a certain position, the universe formed can only form one way. There is no such thing as randomness. A computer program designed to make random choices does not make random choices. It uses a counting program or some other means to make it look random. Everything in the physical world is governed by math, and anyone with any sense knows that math can only give you one answer, one solution. By that, the world is predetermined, considering there is no external element, an element not governed by math, an element we have come to define as the spiritual realm. But let us look back at the physical realm. Let us assume there is no spiritual realm. If that is so, then the world no matter what is predetermined. Whatever happens can only happen one way. This is different from the Greek concept of fate. While the Greeks saw one's end always ending up the same way, the will of the gods always becoming victorious, a predetermined world means that every moment is fate. Every moment is out of our control. We have no power ever. This means we can make no choice. Moreover, let us connect this element of choice to awareness of existence. By being forced to do everything by nature, we have no awareness. Everything is already predetermined including our thoughts. Therefore, our thoughts are not our own. We have no power over our thoughts. When I mean thoughts, I do not mean electrical impulses. I mean thoughts of the soul. These thoughts can only be identified with thoughts you are aware of, that you have control over. The one thought that you always have control over is the thought of your own existence.

purposterous! Our awareness of our own existance can just as easily be out of our control. There is no reason to make a distinction there - that our seeming awareness of existance MUST be some magical thing - that such thoughts could ONLY originate in some otherworldly "SOUL". It could be as biologically natural as self-preservation, altruism, and language.

In other words, you are always aware of your own existence and you are completely aware of your own existence. This means that you know the basic statement, "I am," know as in understand it, and you cannot doubt it. What do I mean by doubt? I mean that while you can't grasp the idea of entire existence, you can't lose grasp of the idea of your own existence. In so much as I can't know everything, I can't stop knowing I am. This force preventing us from losing our unquestionable knowledge of our own existence is the force of life.

Again this is false. Have you ever taken K/LSD/DMT? You can completley loose all sense of yourself, of your ego, of yourself as a seperate individual being. You can indeed "lose grasp of the idea of your own existence" - though you say it is impossible - millions of people prove you wrong.

Granted, I cannot know for certain if you exist. I can only know for certain that I exist. How can I know that? At its root, no words can explain it. But as I translate the words of the source into the words of idea, let me say: "I think, therefore I am." Notice the "I." This does not mean that I can apply this term of thinking to a computer because I am not the computer and therefore I cannot know if the computer is thinking. This thinking is of course on the spiritual level. There is know way to prove it, only for the self to know it for certain. However, we can use this aspect of a flowing time to show how we might come to realize that we know without doubt that "I exist." As I said before, the physical world is predetermined. Everything is already decided. Everything including thought is not one's own. It is already defined, already decided, and therefore stripped of any connection to any sense of self. If I indeed exist, exist on a level outside of the physical world, a level in which I can hold the thought (have the power to say), "I exist," I am not being constrained by the physical world's force of nature to give up this thought. All of our other thoughts may be forced on by nature, we don't know for certain. All I know for certain is "I am." Therefore, I have power. By having power, I am not predetermined. By not being predetermined, I am not of substance with the physical world. What substance am I of then? We define it as the spiritual world, and the self as the soul. I hope you can understand all that I have written here. I agree, Philosophy/Theology uses difficult language. But the language needs to be difficult to convey the richness of the message.

Your sense of self-awareness is just as much predetermined and a part of this physical world as your sense of altruism or language. A good illustration of this is by taking note of how powerful hallucinogens temporarily effect your ego, your sense of self. If your sense of self can not be effected by things of this physical world - then that must make hallucinogens supernatural pills!

I can defend the state of unconsciousness. This is the same state a baby has at conception. The soul is still attached however. This soul is aware of timelessness, yet at the same time connected to a physical body. When the mind activates to allow certain analysis thought, the connection is made to the soul to transfer physical data, data that forces one to think by flowing time. Without that connection, we live in timeless time. That is how we can have no memory of our unconsciousness, for to our soul we exit and enter reality at the same time.

Power of soul? Individuality
You think in your body at a set time in a set place due to physical-spiritual and spiritual-physical transitions. Spiritual world is timeless with unlimited choice. Physical world is timeless by its predetermined choice (or as we would say course of nature). If you were nature, you would think in all bodies and see all things all at the same time. By being from the spiritual world, the transition creates the illusion of flowing time, the illusion of living in a certain body in a certain space. Morover, you wake up in the same body. Granted, you can just be jumping around without knowledge, but the fact that you feal individual at any one point makes you individual forever by its timeless spiritual origin.

The soul is the essence of a person. The essence of a person is every property that person could not fail to have. Necessary properties. In philosophical jargon your essence is the collection of properties which you possess in every possible world in which you exist. Thus obvious properties like being human, being a person, being a thinking being, being identical to yourself.

In the lingo of philosophy it seems as though this discussion is actually about what is now called the \"mind/body problem,\" rather than about the soul as I have defined it.

In terms of the mind/body problem there are several issues with materialism and one issue with dualism. With materialism the is the problem that the first person perspective cannot be reduced to the third person perspective. So, even a full scientific understanding of the brain would not suffice to explain things like consciousness, because consciousness is necessarily first person. There is a classic article in the philosophy of mind about this which is freely available on the internet called \"What is it like to be a bat?\" by Thomas Nagel.

Another problem is that which is delineated by Leibniz. You can imagine enlarging matter such that you can enter into it and see the relations between material components of the brain. But at no point in there would you see anything like a thought or consciousness.

A third problem is that thoughts have properties that brain events don't have. Such as picturing a pink unicorn. There is a pink unicorn in your mind, but nowhere in your brain is a pink unicorn. By Leibniz's law it follows that, since thoughts and brain events have different properties, they are certainly not the same thing.

A fourth problem is the problem of intentionality. Intentionality is \"aboutness\" or \"ofness.\" I think of Napoleon. My thought is about Napoleon. However, how on earth could any physical event be \"about\" something?

My favored argument against materialism is an argument from what is called \"compositonal nihilism\" which is the doctrine that the only physical things that exist are fundamental particles. So chairs are not real objects, but only atoms(atoms here meaning a basic ontologically simple particle and not necessarily atoms as conceived in physics). Those atoms are arranged \"chair-wise.\" Furthermore your body does not exist, there are only atoms arranged body-wise. But it is clear that persons exist. However, the only physical things that exist are fundamental particles and clearly people are not fundamental particles. Thus, people are not physical objects at all.

There are many, many more objections to materialism about the mind, but they all follow basically the same patterns as the above objections. There is one more worth mentioning. Persons change. I was born, I went through the early developmental stages of life, puberty, teenage years, etc. However, what has happened is that something has changed. I am not reinvented in each phase of my life, I am changed. Thus it makes no sense to say 'I am a different person than I was when I was 15' in any strict, logical sense. Since it is an internally contradictory statement. You are saying that you both are and are not yourself, which is contradictory. So there must be some underlying reality which does not change while aspects of your personality, body and brain change. You gain knowledge and experience things. However, all of the cells of your body are replaced several times during your lifetime. So it follows that the underlying reality that stays \"You\" is not a physical thing.

The main problem with dualism or immaterialism is conceiving of how two things as different as physical and nonphysical things might causally interact. So that when I think of moving my arm, my arm moves, which is a physical event caused by a nonphysical intention-to-act. This is a penetrating question, but not much of an objection.

There is a pseudo-problem often brought up. Which is the idea that science has somehow proved that there is no soul or immaterial mind. The reason this is a pseudo-problem is two-fold. Firstly, science has no methodology for studying nonphysical entities. Secondly, an examination of physicalism and interactionist dualism reveals that they would both yield precisely the same empirical results. Thus, the answer to this question must come from philosophy.

The objection \"if you have a soul, where is it located?\" is a category error. Here I am going to address this problem with both the soul and mind, since the response will allow the interchange of words while still keeping the meaning and force of the response. For an object to have location, it is typically thought that it must be physical. Souls(minds) are supposed to be nonphysical. Thus speaking of the location of a soul(mind) is either complete nonsense, or merely not applicable. It's like asking where are Godel's theorems? There are theories of dualism which say that the soul(mind) is both nonphysical and has spatial location. On those theories the soul(mind) would tend to either permeate the body, or brain, or both. However, since the soul(mind) remains nonphysical, it does not displace the physical components of the body. This solves the causal problem, as the physical and nonphysical substances stand in a spatial relation which allows you to explicate a fairly plausible causal theory.

On the topic of free will and determinism. The fact of the matter is that most of us tend to think we have some sort of free will. Two objections to determinism are sufficient to discredit it in my mind.

Firstly, the concept of rational argument requires some sort of freedom of assent or freedom of the will. In order to follow a line of argument and make free choices about which is and is not true. If determinism holds, each of your decisions about what is and is not true is determined by a prior causal state. However, if that is true, you cannot possibly be rational in your decision making. You would have no control over what you believe. Indeed, if determinism holds, then your belief in determinism cannot possibly be rational. Thus, you are free to believe in determinism, but don't make any claims to believing it for good and rational reasons.

Another objection which most people are aware of comes from moral responsibility. Would you hold an avalache morally responsible for killing half a dozen people? If not, then why do you hold human beings morally responsible for their actions when they have no moral control over what they do than an avalanche does? If you claim morality is not real, or a social convention, you can escape this. However, your holding people morally responsible for their actions then becomes arbitrary, and the question becomes why should I take you seriously?

FormerlySV wrote:On the topic of free will and determinism. The fact of the matter is that most of us tend to think we have some sort of free will. Two objections to determinism are sufficient to discredit it in my mind.

I wouldn't describe these as objections. They're just appeals to consequences. You say that if determinism is true, then we cannot "rationally" believe in determinism. You say that if determinism is true, the concept of "moral responsibility" cannot be justified. But these consequences aren't impossible--they're just undesirable, i.e. we hope that they aren't true. But that's not to say that they aren't true.

I'd also like it if you would explain why you think that will is essential for rational arguments to begin with. It makes sense to me to speak of arguments being rational, even if they came from a piece of paper that fell out of the sky. So why would it not make sense to speak of such arguments as being rational? I'm also not convinced that free will and determinism are even incompatible. I'd like it if you would set out what exactly free will is to you if it's not determined. Is it just randomness? What are you imagining free will as here?

I think that you should also set out exactly what you mean by "holding morally responsible." Is it just punishing? Or do we hold something morally responsible just by thinking that it is evil for causing something evil? This requires some more thought before we can discuss whether avalanches can be held morally responsible and if we should expect that avalanches can be held morally responsible.

The history of philosophy is that \"more thought\" so don't suppose we will settle anything here.

The objections take the form of reductios. Since we certainly cannot hold avalanches morally responsible for anything, if determinism holds, we certainly cannot hold persons morally responsible for anything. But, we can hold persons morally responsible for their actions, thus determinism doesn't hold. As with all philosophical problems, the arguments must be judged on the individual strength of premises. What the individual holds as more likely to be true holds more weight. Thus, if determinism is certainly true, then absurd consequences follow, and that's just it. However, if it's not certainly true, and the consequences that follow are most certainly false, then we weight the argument in favor of rejecting the position because of a reductio ad absurdum. You can always bite the bullet and accept any consequences that follow, regardless of how ridiculous they may be.

To hold someone morally responsible is to hold a certain attitude towards them. The attitude is either justified or not. I ought to add the condition that the attitude be justified. Certainly we can hold a rock morally responsible for falling off a cliff and braining someone. However, that would seem to be entirely unjustified.

Rationality is a matter of the subject. I am an internalist with respect to rationality, so this doesn't apply to externalism in regards to rationality. However, not even externalism would allow for a paper from the sky to be rational. The paper itself has no content outside of a mind and it is the reasoning of that mind in accepted or rejecting the conclusion that matters.

The problem with determinism is somewhat surprising. It is not that on determinism everything is irrational, but that on determinism rationality becomes trivial. The traditional deontic version of rationality is about epistemic rights. What are you within your epistemic rights to believe? On determinism we could only say that you are within your epistemic rights to believe just whatever you do, in fact, believe. You could not have believed otherwise. As such this is, again, a reductio. Certainly we want to say that some beliefs are irrational.

Again, you can bite the bullet and say that, indeed, all beliefs are rational because determinism is true. However, it is, again, a weighted argument. For my part, it seems quite a bit more likely that some beliefs are irrational than that determinism is true.

Compatibilist views of free will are interesting. However, they tend to define \"free\" in a grossly counterintuitive way. Such as free will being a causal chain running through an agent in the \"right\" way. Thus, the truth of compatibilism qua compatibilism seems to me only relevant to the free will versus determinism debate in that it is a flavor of determinism. The most plausible formulation of compatibilism is Harry Frankfurt, who says free will is the ability to have a second order desire to prefer a first order desire. The second order desire effecting the acting upon of the first order desire. But it seems to me that the chain becomes lengthy indeed and once we ask what the cause of the second order desire is, we are left with bare determinism.

As for my definition of free will I take a standard libertarian definition. The essence of free will is not in actions being uncaused or random(since uncaused and/or random would be even worse than determinism, consequentially) but in the agent herself being the cause. Like in Aristotle. The staff moves the stone, the staff is moved by a hand, the hand is moved by a man.

FormerlySV wrote:To hold someone morally responsible is to hold a certain attitude towards them. The attitude is either justified or not. I ought to add the condition that the attitude be justified. Certainly we can hold a rock morally responsible for falling off a cliff and braining someone. However, that would seem to be entirely unjustified.

Saying that it is to hold a "certain attitude" doesn't really help answer my question. E.g., in the past, I have called tsunamis evil. The Christians I was talking with at the time seemed to dismiss this as being an inappropriate application of an ethical term. But I would assert that it makes sense to say this. Is this assigning moral responsibility? And in general terms, how would we know?

FormerlySV wrote:As for my definition of free will I take a standard libertarian definition. The essence of free will is not in actions being uncaused or random(since uncaused and/or random would be even worse than determinism, consequentially) but in the agent herself being the cause. Like in Aristotle. The staff moves the stone, the staff is moved by a hand, the hand is moved by a man.

But you seem to be alleging that the way that the staff moves the stone is nothing like the way that the man moves his hand. We might suppose that the stone is moved by the staff because of a necessary series of cause and effect as per a deterministic model of the universe. But how does cause and effect work inside of the agent according to your conception of free will? Is cause and effect somehow fuzzier, i.e. one thought "might" cause another? (But this seems to just introduce randomness, which you're against too.) So it's clear to me that you're opposing a deterministic model here inside the agent. But it's not exactly clear to me how.

FormerlySV wrote:The objections take the form of reductios.

This might make sense if we had good reason to think that our initial intuitions are correct here. It's possible that intuitions concerning "rationality" and "moral responsibility" and "free will" are incorrect if these things become impossible in a deterministic model and that maybe we don't really have a correct understanding of these things.

Saying that it is to hold a \"certain attitude\" doesn't really help answer my question. E.g., in the past, I have called tsunamis evil. The Christians I was talking with at the time seemed to dismiss this as being an inappropriate application of an ethical term. But I would assert that it makes sense to say this. Is this assigning moral responsibility? And in general terms, how would we know?

I think calling a tsunamis evil is completely incorrect as well. However, those who believe in natural evils tend to distinguish them from moral evils. To hold someone morally responsible for something is to say they should not have done what they did. A tsunamis has no control over what it does.

But you seem to be alleging that the way that the staff moves the stone is nothing like the way that the man moves his hand.

Not at all. The staff moves the stone in precisely the same way the hand moves the staff and in the same way the man moves the hand. What I say is that the man's choice to move his hand is self-explanatory. Thus the question of what caused the man to choose to move his hand is nonsensical.

This might make sense if we had good reason to think that our initial intuitions are correct here. It's possible that intuitions concerning \"rationality\" and \"moral responsibility\" and \"free will\" are incorrect if these things become impossible in a deterministic model and that maybe we don't really have a correct understanding of these things.

My stance is that we need no good reasons to believe our intuitions. What we need to do is only consider reasons against our intuitions. Otherwise it's trivially easy to generate a skeptical argument which leaves knowledge beyond reach. I did deal with this indirectly quite thoroughly. The reasons for believing determinism would have to be good enough to justify determinism over more basic, intuitive beliefs. Otherwise it's epistemically far more likely that we've simply made a mistake in choosing the deterministic model.

FormerlySV wrote:Not at all. The staff moves the stone in precisely the same way the hand moves the staff and in the same way the man moves the hand. What I say is that the man's choice to move his hand is self-explanatory. Thus the question of what caused the man to choose to move his hand is nonsensical.

What? No, I'm pretty sure that something is still left to be explained: how this all happens under the hood. Not-determism isn't a model for free will. We know it's not determined. We know it's not random. So what is it?

FormerlySV wrote:To hold someone morally responsible for something is to say they should not have done what they did.

OK, I think I know what you mean by holding morally responsible now. This is the bullet that I'm willing to bite: that understanding free will will always be a problem for humans. Free will is not possible according to the way that humans experience the universe, yet humans cannot experience the universe without it. It's this thing that we know is inconceivable, yet it's this assumption that our brains make in order to conceive anything. It's quite a bind.

I don't think that a subject as problematic as human free will should be used to draw such sweeping conclusions about whether or not we live in a deterministic universe. It's really more of a personal problem if you ask me.

Your responses are snappy and interesting. Just the way I like 'em.

What? No, I'm pretty sure that something is still left to be explained: how this all happens under the hood. Not-determism isn't a model for free will. We know it's not determined. We know it's not random. So what is it?

I disagree. But here is further explanation. This variety of free will actually involves a bit of determinism. It is strictly not compatibilist free will. The determinism that it does involve is the agent as first cause. Determinism requires the initially plausible principle that external causal chains always run through the subject. This form of free will claims that the subject is capable of initiating causal chains.

As such there are, as I see it, only three options. First, agent's ability is a brute fact. That means there is no explanation. Not just that we don't know the explanation, but that there is none. Second, the agent's ability is self-explanatory. That is, when I say \"I moved my arm\" and you asked \"what caused you to move your arm?\" and I say \"I caused me to move my arm\" you can only repeat \"what caused you to move your arm?\" and I can only repeat \"I caused me to move my arm\" and that seems quite plausible to me. The third option is yours. Just admit that you don't have a clue how it works and probably never will. I happen to accept 2 and 3 somewhat. I think the second option is the most plausible explanation, but I am not certain and probably never will be.

I don't think that a subject as problematic as human free will should be used to draw such sweeping conclusions about whether or not we live in a deterministic universe. It's really more of a personal problem if you ask me.

You seem to have some familiarity with philosophy. If you have a great deal of familiarity I think you will agree that there is pretty much nothing that is not problematic. I simply believe that things closer to home, such as free will, ought to inform our understanding of things further from home, and not the other way around, unless the evidence is sufficiently stifling.

There is a conclusion I left out. We can say at least three things:

1. Nature is deterministic. Our faculty of will is part of nature. Therefore our faculty of will is deterministic.

2. Our faculty of will is not deterministic. Our faculty of will is natural. Therefore, nature is not deterministic.

3(the one I left out). Nature is deterministic. Our faculty of will is not deterministic. Therefore, our faculty of will is not natural.

I am sure there are other variations, but I loath to think of them right now.

FormerlySV wrote:Second, the agent's ability is self-explanatory. That is, when I say "I moved my arm" and you asked "what caused you to move your arm?" and I say "I caused me to move my arm" you can only repeat "what caused you to move your arm?" and I can only repeat "I caused me to move my arm" and that seems quite plausible to me.

That sounds like a problem of language. No really though, I'm not convinced, just because that type of response would make sense in conversation, that then our burden of explaining free will is somehow absolved in truth.

FormerlySV wrote:I simply believe that things closer to home, such as free will, ought to inform our understanding of things further from home, and not the other way around, unless the evidence is sufficiently stifling.

How funny, I'm of the opposite inclination. You do have to admit: the number of seemingly deterministic phenomena do have us outnumbered fairly well.

FormerlySV wrote:3(the one I left out). Nature is deterministic. Our faculty of will is not deterministic. Therefore, our faculty of will is not natural.

I have to reject this because it seems to imply some sort of dualism, which, by reading one of your other posts, isn't a problem for you.

That sounds like a problem of language.

It's a literary device. Think Plato's dialectic.

How funny, I'm of the opposite inclination. You do have to admit: the number of seemingly deterministic phenomena do have us outnumbered fairly well.

I wish you well on the short road to complete skepticism Deterministic phenomena do have us outnumbered. But the relevant evidence would be about us.

I have to reject this because it seems to imply some sort of dualism, which, by reading one of your other posts, isn't a problem for you.

Correct, it implies dualism. Also correct, not a problem for me at all.

FormerlySV wrote:It's a literary device. Think Plato's dialectic.

I believe that the language is intentionally misleading in this case. Just because language has evolved to talk about will in a certain way doesn't mean that will is like that in truth. It's word play, in other words.

FormerlySV wrote:I wish you well on the short road to complete skepticism

I appreciate your concern, but, in the finest skeptic tradition, I doubt that.

I believe that the language is intentionally misleading in this case. Just because language has evolved to talk about will in a certain way doesn't mean that will is like that in truth. It's word play, in other words.

I see no reason to believe that. What are your reasons for believing that?

I appreciate your concern, but, in the finest skeptic tradition, I doubt that.

Very punny! What would I be if I didn't care deeply about what philosophical conclusions you embrace? Seriously though, it seems quite problematic to think your closest and clearest perceptions are fundamentally mistaken, while thinking the things you have less knowledge of will somehow tell you more about yourself than your direct experience of yourself.

FormerlySV wrote:I see no reason to believe that. What are your reasons for believing that?

Well, first off, do you even know if your hypothetical dialog is translatable to and will demonstrate the same point in all known languages? I'm skeptical that you can guarantee this. You might try to make this argument in Eskimo, to which the Eskimo might just raise his eyebrow in confusion. What would your argument to the Eskimo be then? Your argument might only make sense in some languages, such as English, because of their unique idiosyncrasies. But even if you could guarantee that your argument is translatable to all languages, this might only demonstrate an idiosyncrasy universal to all human language. I'm hoping though that that thought is at least making you nervous, and it highlights my concern.

To give an example of a similar idiosyncrasy (that's at least present in English), consider how we speak of functions teleologically in biology. "Why do we have eyes?" "Judging by it's natural properties, so that we can see." A naive analysis of this conversation might conclude from this that the purpose of the eye is to see, but, in truth, all that's really been discussed is the eye's function, despite the language that says otherwise.

Why do we speak of biological functions like that though? I suspect it goes back to the evolution of language when humans were of a more teleological bend, when this actually would make more sense. I don't think we should take from this feature of language that eyes have some sort inherent natural purpose just because we speak of them as having one though.

Along the same vein, before we even knew of the paradoxical nature of free will, we needed to evolve ways of talking about our wills, for obvious reasons. Language evolved to meet the need, but not with the aim of respecting the true nature of free will, just with the aim of utility, of being able to talk about it in useful ways. Trying to take a feature of language that arose to talk about the paradoxical nature of our wills and then using it to gather something about the nature of free will itself seems dangerous.

Besides, even if successful, it seems like all you're doing is deferring the paradox. Now you owe an explanation of how free will (or how anything in general) can be "self-explanatory" if this is how you're really asserting it is.

FormerlySV wrote:Very punny! What would I be if I didn't care deeply about what philosophical conclusions you embrace? Seriously though, it seems quite problematic to think your closest and clearest perceptions are fundamentally mistaken, while thinking the things you have less knowledge of will somehow tell you more about yourself than your direct experience of yourself.

Don't get me wrong--I'm only doubting one "closest perception" in favor of other evidence--non-compatibilist free will.

The percept of free will doesn't include much information with it other than "it's there," whatever "it" is. Perhaps it exists in a compatibilist sense. Perhaps it's a mental illusion. Whatever it is though, I don't doubt that it's there.

What I do doubt is that non-compatibilist free will can exist in this universe or in any conceivable universe.

Interesting response. At no point did I see a reason to believe the language was intentionally misleading. Indeed, the argument cast doubt on your own use of language in responding to it. A general consideration that language might be misleading is hardly enough of a reason to think that it actually is. You'll need to expand. Otherwise it looks like you're running into self-referential absurdities. On another take the argument is question-begging. As you tacitly abandon teleological thinking. But the libertarian explicitly accepts it and it is precisely the nature of libertarian free will that it invokes teleology.

Besides, even if successful, it seems like all you're doing is deferring the paradox. Now you owe an explanation of how free will (or how anything in general) can be \"self-explanatory\" if this is how you're really asserting it is.

This is what I am saying. Unfortunately what you have pointed out is just a very general problem of philosophy. Once you've explained one thing, you are typically forced to explain what did the explaining.

Don't get me wrong--I'm only doubting one \"closest perception\" in favor of other evidence--non-compatibilist free will.

That's entirely acceptable. However, I still see no reason whatsoever to be a determinist.

FormerlySV wrote:At no point did I see a reason to believe the language was intentionally misleading. Indeed, the argument cast doubt on your own use of language in responding to it. A general consideration that language might be misleading is hardly enough of a reason to think that it actually is. You'll need to expand.

I suppose that someone could argue that we should doubt the usefulness of all language, but my argument is that we should be suspicious of the usefulness of some language in certain cases. Let's first take a look again at the example of teleology in biology:

A: "Why do we have eyes?"
B: "So that we can see."

Even though this answer seems to validate and name the purpose of eyes--so that we can see--I think that have good reasons to believe that the language here is misleading and to doubt that eyes have any sort of natural purpose:

1. This dialog is rather ad hoc and specially constructed. For example, I wouldn't trust any old dialog about the function of the eye to reveal that its function is its purpose.
2. The argument for eyes having a natural purpose cannot be made using more "direct" language. For example, we can make sentences that simultaneously seem to indicate that eyes have purposes and seem to be true, but we cannot otherwise explain how eyes can even have natural purposes or why they are to see.
3. Historically, language evolved under a certain frame of mind, one of teleological naturalism, which is a frame of mind that we generally reject today. This explains how teleological language in biology could be an artifact and how such language arose in the first place.

I think that we can doubt the usefulness of your dialog for similar reasons:

1. It too is ad hoc and specially crafted. (This isn't necessarily a criticism, but it certainly arouses some suspicion.) This isn't a point that would be demonstrable out of normal conversation.
2. We cannot explain how free will might be "self-explanatory" through any other language than just crafting specific sentences that seem to be true that seem to demonstrate the case.
3. Language evolved under a certain understanding of will, one that we might want to argue against or reject today.

I can also point out a criticism specific to your dialog. Consider the following line: "I caused me to move my arm." The use of pronouns contributes to an ambiguity that aids your argument. For example, I'm not convinced that "I" and "me" have the same antecedents here. It may be interpreted as follows: I (my will) caused me (my body) to move my arm. Then there's nothing "self-explanatory" about it. Even if we could be convinced that the antecedent is the same in these sentences, I still don't think that it demonstrates anything being "self-explanatory." For example: My will caused my will to move my arm. For one thing, I don't think that a sentence like this even makes sense. But supposing it did, it would just indicate that some previous action of the will caused the present will to move your arm. In any case, I'm going to insist that, if you're going to continue to argue the utility of this dialog in demonstrating the "self-explanatory" nature of the will, then you provide an example with all pronouns removed from the dialog. Otherwise, all it seems to be is wordplay.

FormerlySV wrote:This is what I am saying. Unfortunately what you have pointed out is just a very general problem of philosophy. Once you've explained one thing, you are typically forced to explain what did the explaining.

That doesn't make it any more impressive.

FormerlySV wrote:That's entirely acceptable. However, I still see no reason whatsoever to be a determinist.

Whether or not the universe is deterministic is for the physicists to decide, not by concerns of moral responsibility that depend on inconceivable notions of free will.

A: \"Why do we have eyes?\"
B: \"So that we can see.\"

Seems perfectly fine to me. Of course, on a certain, very implausible theory(ontological naturalism) such an explanation couldn't possibly be true. However, I've spent quite some time on arguments for ontological naturalism, and never found one that was even plausible, much less persuasive. You do seem to grasp a point recently expounded by Jerry Fodor that much of the naturalistic language in science is actually teleological. And, since he is a thoroughgoing naturalist, he has to conclude that the \"selection for\" language in evolutionary biology is fictional. As he said \"nothing stifles one's causal powers like not existing.\"

Historically, language evolved under a certain frame of mind, one of teleological naturalism, which is a frame of mind that we generally reject today. This explains how teleological language in biology could be an artifact and how such language arose in the first place.

You seem to be treating language as some static entity. That not plausible, of course, as language continue to evolve. At any rate, this is again, a purely skeptical argument, and would apply to any language we choose to use. At any future time someone could use the same argument about the language we would choose to use now.

I can also point out a criticism specific to your dialog. Consider the following line: \"I caused me to move my arm.\" The use of pronouns contributes to an ambiguity that aids your argument.

The ambiguity perhaps exists, but only because the sentence is meant to get across the idea that asking \"what caused you to cause you to move your arm\" is, as I claim, nonsensical.

That doesn't make it any more impressive.

I wasn't trying to make anything impressive. Only to point out that such an objection or consideration is vacuous, since we could play the same game for all eternity with just any topic you please.

Whether or not the universe is deterministic is for the physicists to decide, not by concerns of moral responsibility that depend on inconceivable notions of free will.

But, as we saw in an earlier argument the freedom or determination of the will have no necessary connection to anything provided by physics. So the matter is better settled on philosophical grounds.

For one thing, I don't think that a sentence like this even makes sense. But supposing it did, it would just indicate that some previous action of the will caused the present will to move your arm. In any case, I'm going to insist that, if you're going to continue to argue the utility of this dialog in demonstrating the \"self-explanatory\" nature of the will, then you provide an example with all pronouns removed from the dialog. Otherwise, all it seems to be is wordplay.

I will have to decline your request, as it is blatantly a form of word play. It steers the conversation misleadingly towards determinism. Furthermore, you have tacitly assumed determinism in your analysis of the sentence. No wonder it doesn't make sense to you, since it expresses an idea completely opposed to the idea you are taking from it.

FormerlySV wrote:You seem to be treating language as some static entity. That not plausible, of course, as language continue to evolve. At any rate, this is again, a purely skeptical argument, and would apply to any language we choose to use. At any future time someone could use the same argument about the language we would choose to use now.

If you think that I treated language "staticly" and if you think that treating language as "dynamic" as opposed to "static" somehow changes my argument, then you should demonstrate how this affects my argument. However, for now I will say that I hope, if people in the future have the type of concerns that I outlined earlier about the language that we are using today, that they call the same language into question.

FormerlySV wrote:I wasn't trying to make anything impressive. Only to point out that such an objection or consideration is vacuous, since we could play the same game for all eternity with just any topic you please.

In practice, it's possible that we would eventually find common ground and then say, "Oh yeah, that makes sense." In fact, that's the ideal end. But in any case, we haven't diverged from the topic in question enough to justify not explaining anything further. Part of my argument is that non-compatibilist free will is nonsensical. If you think that free will is "self-explanatory," then you need to flesh out more on what this means and how anything can be "self-explanatory."

FormerlySV wrote:I will have to decline your request, as it is blatantly a form of word play. It steers the conversation misleadingly towards determinism. Furthermore, you have tacitly assumed determinism in your analysis of the sentence. No wonder it doesn't make sense to you, since it expresses an idea completely opposed to the idea you are taking from it.

We could try to find meaning in a sentence like, "My will caused my will to move my arm," if we really tried to, but it's not the sort of sentence that a native English speaker would say.

If you think that analyzing the antecedents misleadingly steers the conversation toward determinism, well, then, yes, that's part of the point, minus the misleading part of course. If you think that analyzing the antecedents is unfair, then you need to explain why.

There also seems to be missing premises in between the free will question being nonsensical and free will being self-explanatory. Showing that a question is nonsensical doesn't in itself show that it is "self-explanatory" (or maybe it does, since you still haven't fleshed out what this really means). As a bonus, this will probably be helpful for understanding what you're trying to argue as a whole.

If you think that I treated language \"staticly\" and if you think that treating language as \"dynamic\" as opposed to \"static\" somehow changes my argument, then you should demonstrate how this affects my argument.

This consideration matters because in order to cast substantiated doubt on the language, you would have to construct a plausible historical narrative concerning the etymology of the words themselves. I doubt you can, since such evidence is, as far as I know, non-existent.

In practice, it's possible that we would eventually find common ground and then say, \"Oh yeah, that makes sense.\" In fact, that's the ideal end.

Perhaps. Such an end is not yet possible, however. Since self-explanation resists \"fleshing out.\"

If you think that analyzing the antecedents misleadingly steers the conversation toward determinism, well, then, yes, that's part of the point, minus the misleading part of course. If you think that analyzing the antecedents is unfair, then you need to explain why.

No, I don't think the analysis of the antecedents does anything like that. But I do think that a removing of words necessary to express the idea pretty much paralyzes the discussion. It's as if you were to ask me to discuss morality without reference to right and wrong. I tried to make it clear(and I'm bad at making things clear) that \"I cause my arm to move\" is meant only as a gesturing towards the consideration that there is no need to look outside of the agent for the full causal story of arm moving.

There also seems to be missing premises in between the free will question being nonsensical and free will being self-explanatory. Showing that a question is nonsensical doesn't in itself show that it is \"self-explanatory\" (or maybe it does, since you still haven't fleshed out what this really means).

See the earlier comment on self-explanation. If you want something of more formal reason, it is simply that, since looking for an explanation outside of the person's willing something is nonsensical, and there must be an explanation, the explanation must be in the willing itself. And all of that seems fairly plausible to me.

We are really hung at, perhaps, an impasse. Since, as I see it unfolding now, the real concern is over whether or not our ordinary language concepts apply to reality. Perhaps we might do well to get your reasons on why, for some sentence to not be misleading, it has to translate into(all?) other languages.

I don't know if I want to go there yet. I'd like to continue addressing this line of thought first: \"'I cause my arm to move' is meant only as gesturing towards the consideration that there is no need to look outside of the agent for the full causal story of arm moving.\"

Well actually this first, which you gave in my response to my request that you don't use ambiguous pronouns: \"I will have to decline your request, as it is blatantly a form of word play. It steers the conversation misleadingly towards determinism.\"

Here's the problem: you can come up with the same form of argument for explaining the behavior of any sufficiently complex object by using ambiguous pronouns. \"Hmm, my computer printed out a message. What caused it to print out a message?\" \"It caused it to print out a message.\" \"True, but what caused it to print out a message?\" Etc.

When you're using a pronoun like \"I,\" you're referring to any number of components of people, like their bodies, their minds, their wills, and so on. These can be during different times as well. So when you say a sentence like, \"I caused me to move my arm,\" it's not entirely clear which aspect of you is being referred to, and when. One entirely intuitive interpretation that I already offered is as follows: \"I (my will) caused me (my body) to move my arm.\" Your specific goal is to show that the will itself is somehow self-causing. However, you're trying to use ambiguous language to show a fairly specific thing.

In any case, you've already as much as admitted that trying to replace the pronouns with antecedents will \"stear the conversation toward determinism.\" Why should we favor your example of language over the other examples that suggest determinism?

Hello, Jeff.

In answer to several lines of thought.

Firstly, I agree that the ambiguous use of pronouns can be extended to impersonal objects, such as the computer. But isn't this just the more obvious abuse of anthropomorphizing impersonal objects? Secondly, I admit that removing the pronouns steers the debate towards determinism. Since, as I see it, it is the opposite mistake. In one case you use personal descriptions of a computer as if they had will. In the second case you remove the personality from the subject who has will. Thirdly, my reasons for preferring the language I use is simply that it is the normal way to think about my own exercising of causal powers. \"I move my arm\" doesn't generally involve the idea of some external process causing a chain of events which leads to the movement of my arm. Perhaps it should, but I see no reason to think that. It seems to me that \"I moved my arm\" is entirely enough explanation for why the arm moved. Indeed, I think the more plausible story for the language evolving the way it did was that the language best suited the way things are.

On the assumption of the necessity of some sort of physicalism about the mind i.e. that the brain is indeed all there is to me and my thinking, there are grounds to think determinism is true. Since it seems the case that physics would tell us something like that. Appeals to quantum theory being insufficient to establish anything but pure randomness, and that on unnecessary interpretations of the theory. But I see no necessity in believing physicalism about the mind, as laid out earlier.

No, it's not at all obvious that anything is being anthropomorphized. (Again, if you think that this is the case, you should explain why...) There aren't any personal descriptions in the example, at least not anything I would call a personal description, and, in any case, that wasn't the point of the example. The point is more so this: if you take a sufficiently complex object that has many components or that performs many different processes but then try to refer to the entire object as the cause of something, you're going to run into problems like the ones that we do in your dialog. If you only allow the use of pronouns that refer to a complex object as a whole (such as \"it\" to refer to a computer), you're never going to get a satisfactory answer to the question of why something specific happened, like why it printed out a message.

This type of language might be more natural or intuitive for a lot of day-to-day conversation, especially when we are dealing with objects or people as a whole. But is it more natural for answering a question like, \"What caused you to voluntarily move your arm?\" That's not at all a natural question to be asking in the first place, so there's no expectation for a natural-sounding answer. It's the type of question that requires more precise analysis using more precise language, the kind of analysis and language that is already being used in the sciences.

The point is that you are treating the computer as if it had a will. That is anthropomorphizing the computer. That anthropomorphizing something can go beyond surface words is admitted.

\"What caused you to voluntarily move your arm?\"

Again, such a question assumes determinism to have any substance. On a common sense view of the self, such a question is nonsensical. It's as if we were to ask \"what caused the first cause?\" which is a blatantly silly question.

Person P performs action A for reason R is self explanatory. There is the unstated causal chain between P's willing A for R, but it's unnecessary to ask what caused P to will A for R. This shows why the computer example is anthropomorphizing. Computers do things for reasons only if those reasons are assigned by a person.

In my computer analogy, I was talking about causes, not reasons (i.e. efficient causes vs. final causes). There's no anthropomorphism.

FormerlySV wrote:ince looking for an explanation outside of the person's willing something is nonsensical, and there must be an explanation, the explanation must be in the willing itself. And all of that seems fairly plausible to me.

Before I continue with my current line of thought, I want to first take issue with your assumption that "there must be an explanation." Isn't this "assuming determinism"? I'm not convinced that this assumption is in play in the "common" understanding of the will and in the "common" language that we use to describe it. So why assume that the will has (or should have) an explanation according to the common understanding? That the "common" understanding of the will has no explanation is really the case I'm trying to make here, and to assume that this is not the case to demonstrate such hardly seems fair.

Before I continue with my current line of thought, I want to first take issue with your assumption that \"there must be an explanation.\" Isn't this \"assuming determinism\"?

I don't know of anyone making this objection. But I am a firm advocate of the principle of sufficient reason. If the PSR is incompatible with libertarian free will, then one or the other is impossible. However, I think libertarian free will is compatible with final causes. It's an interesting objection, I just don't see it. Perhaps you can make a stronger case.

Supposing you can, then libertarian free will is either uncaused--which is a common theory of libertarian free will which I think it obviously false--or random. If it's random, that's enough of a reductio to make it quite implausible.

That's not quite my line of thought--I'm not talking here on whether or not libertarian free will has or should be expected to have an explanation, although not because I don't think that that's an interesting topic. What I am disputing is that someone's will is expected to have an explanation according to the \"common sense\" understanding of the will that you're appealing to in your argument. We can betray the common sense understanding and analyze it, supposing that there must be an explanation by appealing to something like the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and then we can try to make some inferences. But if we can do this, why not betray the common sense understanding and give an analysis with a more deterministic bend?

Anyways, here's a continuation of my other line of thought. When we ask, \"What caused the computer to print that message?\" we aren't necessarily looking outside the computer for an explanation. We would find an answer like, \"The computer's X did Y,\" to be satisfactory. In the same sense, when we ask, \"What caused you to move your arm?\" we aren't necessarily looking outside the person for an explanation. So when you give the following argument:

\"ince looking for an explanation outside of the person's willing something is nonsensical, and there must be an explanation, the explanation must be in the willing itself. And all of that seems fairly plausible to me.\"

It's not clear to me that just looking for an explanation outside of the person's will is nonsensical. If the question is nonsensical, then looking for an explanation in general is nonsensical.

Also, as an aside, how do you jump from something like \"explanation outside person\" to \"explanation outside of person's willing\"? This is unclear to me, since pronouns like \"I\" and \"me\" best refer to persons, and you resist replacing the pronouns with antecedents like \"my will.\"

Sorry I didn't respond more quickly. We had a full day of heavy snowfall here yesterday and it took the power out and everything. Which is actually quite nice sometimes, don't you think? It's amazing how much NOISE the seemingly passive electronics around a house make.

We can betray the common sense understanding and analyze it, supposing that there must be an explanation by appealing to something like the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and then we can try to make some inferences. But if we can do this, why not betray the common sense understanding and give an analysis with a more deterministic bend?

Well I hope I answered this already with the acting on reasons being self-explanatory. I think that's the normal way to think about it. We can certainly bracket that and analyze it as if it weren't the nromal way to think. But I think we're left with that being the most intuitive explanation, with very little in the way of deterministic considerations which would challenge it.

We would find an answer like, \"The computer's X did Y,\" to be satisfactory. In the same sense, when we ask, \"What caused you to move your arm?\" we aren't necessarily looking outside the person for an explanation. So when you give the following argument:

This is true. This is the unmentioned part of the causal story I referenced earlier. But I assume the real question in the free will versus determinism versus compatibilism debate is where the causal chain terminates in the past. Or, more intuitively, where the causal chain began in the first place. It seems the determinist thinks it must be located outside of the person. Perhaps the causal chain is even infinite. I have trouble with reference to infinite causal chains, since it seems like the explain nothing. Or perhaps the chain is finite, which is to admit a first member. But if there can be genuine first members of causal chains, I see no problem with locating first members of causal chains in persons. In fact that seems to be most natural.

It's not clear to me that just looking for an explanation outside of the person's will is nonsensical. If the question is nonsensical, then looking for an explanation in general is nonsensical.

As you'll notice earlier I compared looking at an explanation outside of the person to looking for the cause of the first cause. Yes, this assumes libertarianism, so as an argument AGAINST determinism it is question-begging. However, it is a defense of what I take to be a common sense determinism which effectively protects it from deterministic objections. Since those deterministic objections can then be shown to assume determinism. And the objections from within libertarianism make no sense whatsoever.

Also, as an aside, how do you jump from something like \"explanation outside person\" to \"explanation outside of person's willing\"? This is unclear to me, since pronouns like \"I\" and \"me\" best refer to persons, and you resist replacing the pronouns with antecedents like \"my will.\"

There vagueness on my part there. I really mean to say, more precisely, that to look outside of a persons's willing A for R is unnecessary. And on libertarianism, a question about what caused or explains a persons's willing A for R outside of a person's willing A for R is a senseless question. So the question is really posed in terms of an assumption of determinism already. The libertarian terminates the explanation with P's willing A for R, and claims it is a self-explanatory unity. Analogously, but(keep in mind) somewhat misleadingly, the truth of any conjunction is explained by the truth of the conjuncts.

All right. I'm going to go back to reading.