DescentBB

Zoop! wrote:HAPPY TAX DAY!!!!!!!!!!!1111Horray

Defender wrote:Got $1800.
My g/f got a nice ring.

Bill Benson's findings, published in "The Law That Never Was," make a convincing case that the 16th amendment was not legally ratified and that Secretary of State Philander Knox was not merely in error, but committed fraud when he declared it ratified in February 1913. What follows is a summary of some of the major findings for many of the states, showing that their ratifications were not legal and should not have been counted.

The 16th amendment had been sent out in 1909 to the state governors for ratification by the state legislatures after having been passed by Congress. There were 48 states at that time, and three-fourths, or 36, of them were required to give their approval in order for it to be ratified. The process took almost the whole term of the Taft administration, from 1909 to 1913.

Knox had received responses from 42 states when he declared the 16th amendment ratified on February 25, 1913, just a few days before leaving office to make way for the administration of Woodrow Wilson. Knox acknowledged that four of those states (Utah, Conn, R.I. and N.H.) had rejected it, and he counted 38 states as having approved it. We will now examine some of the key evidence Bill Benson found regarding the approval of the amendment in many of those states.

In Kentucky, the legislature acted on the amendment without even having received it from the governor (the governor of each state was to transmit the proposed amendment to the state legislature). The version of the amendment that the Kentucky legislature made up and acted upon omitted the words "on income" from the text, so they weren't even voting on an income tax! When they straightened that out (with the help of the governor), the Kentucky senate rejected the amendment. Yet Philander Knox counted Kentucky as approving it!

In Oklahoma, the legislature changed the wording of the amendment so that its meaning was virtually the opposite of what was intended by Congress, and this was the version they sent back to Knox. Yet Knox counted Oklahoma as approving it, despite a memo from his chief legal counsel, Reuben Clark, that states were not allowed to change it in any way.

Attorneys who have studied the subject have agreed that Kentucky and Oklahoma should not have been counted as approvals by Philander Knox, and, moreover, if any state could be shown to have violated its own state constitution or laws in its approval process, then that state's approval would have to be thrown out. That gets us past the "presumptive conclusion" argument, which says that the actions of an executive official cannot be judged by a court, and admits that Knox could be wrong.

If we subtract Kentucky and Oklahoma from the 38 approvals above, the count of valid approvals falls to 36, the exact number needed for ratification. If any more states can be shown to have had invalid approvals, the 16th amendment must be regarded as null and void.

The state constitution of Tennessee prohibited the state legislature from acting on any proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution sent by Congress until after the next election of state legislators. The intent, of course, is to give the proposed amendment a chance to become an issue in the state legislative elections so that the people can have a voice in determining the outcome. It also provides a cooling off period to reduce the tendency to approve an idea just because it happens to be the moment's trend. You've probably already guessed that the Tennessee legislature did not hold off on voting for the amendment until after the next election, and you'd be right - they didn't; hence, they acted upon it illegally before they were authorized to do so. They also violated their own state constitution by failing to read the resolution on three different days as prescribed by Article II, Section 18. These state constitutional violations make their approval of the amendment null and void. Their approval is and was invalid, and it brings the number of approving states down to 35, one less than required for ratification.

Texas and Louisiana violated provisions in their state constitutions prohibiting the legislatures from empowering the federal government with any additional taxing authority. Now the number is down to 33.

Twelve other states, besides Tennessee, violated provisions in their constitutions requiring that a bill be read on three different days before voting on it. This is not a trivial requirement. It allows for a cooling off period; it enables members who may be absent one day to be present on another; it allows for a better familiarity with, and understanding of, the measure under consideration, since some members may not always read a bill or resolution before voting on it (believe it or not!). States violating this procedure were: Mississippi, Ohio, Arkansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, West Virginia, Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Colorado, and Illinois. Now the number is reduced to 21 states legally ratifying the amendment.

When Secretary Knox transmitted the proposed amendment to the states, official certified and sealed copies were sent. Likewise, when state results were returned to Knox, it was required that the documents, including the resolution that was actually approved, be properly certified, signed, and sealed by the appropriate official(s). This is no more than any ordinary citizen has to do in filing any legal document, so that it's authenticity is assured; otherwise it is not acceptable and is meaningless. How much more important it is to authenticate a constitutional amendment! Yet a number of states did not do this, returning uncertified, unsigned, and/or unsealed copies, and did not rectify their negligence even after being reminded and warned by Knox. The most egregious offenders were Ohio, California, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Minnesota - which did not send any copy at all, so Knox could not have known what they even voted on! Since four of these states were already disqualified above, California is now subtracted from the list of valid approvals, reducing it to 20.

These last five states, along with Kentucky and Oklahoma, have particularly strong implications with regard to the fraud charge against Knox, in that he cannot be excused for not knowing they shouldn't have been counted. Why was he in such a hurry? Why did he not demand that they send proper documentation? They never did.

Further review would make the list dwindle down much more, but with the number down to 20, sixteen fewer than required, this is a suitable place to rest, without getting into the matter of several states whose constitutions limited the taxing authority of their legislatures, which could not give to the federal govern authority they did not have.

The results from the six states Knox had not heard from at the time he made his proclamation do not affect the conclusion that the amendment was not legally ratified. Of those six: two (Virginia and Pennsylvania) he never did hear from, because they ignored the proposed amendment; Florida rejected it; two others (Vermont and Massachusetts) had rejected it much earlier by recorded votes, but, strangely, submitted to the Secretary within a few days of his ratification proclamation that they had passed it (without recorded votes); West Virginia had purportedly approved it at the end of January 1913, but its notification had not yet been received (remember that West Virginia had violated its own constitution, as noted above).

Queensbury, NY â?? On January 25, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that taxpayers cannot be compelled by the IRS to turn over personal and private property to the IRS, absent a federal court order.

Quoting from the decision (Schulz v. IRS, case number 04-0196-cv), "...absent an effort to seek enforcement through a federal court, IRS SUMMONSES APPLY NO FORCE TO TAXPAYERS, AND NO CONSEQUENCE WHATEVER CAN BEFALL A TAXPAYER WHO REFUSES, IGNORES, OR OTHERWISE DOES NOT COMPLY WITH AN IRS SUMMONS UNTIL THAT SUMMONS IS BACKED BY A FEDERAL COURT ORDER...[A TAXPAYER] CANNOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT, ARRESTED, DETAINED, OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED FOR REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ORIGINAL IRS SUMMONS, NO MATTER THE TAXPAYER'S REASONS, OR LACK OF REASONS FOR SO REFUSING."

Without declaring those provisions of the Code unconstitutional on their face, the court, in effect, nullified key enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, stripping the IRS of much of its power to compel compliance with its administrative demands for personal and private property. The court characterized IRS summonses issued under Section 7602 as mere "requests."

The court went on to say that the federal courts are there to protect taxpayers from an "overreaching" IRS, and that the IRS must go through the federal courts before force can be applied on anyone by the IRS to turn over personal and private property to the IRS.

IN ADDITION, THE COURT HELD, IN EFFECT, THAT THE ENFORCEMENT LANGUAGE OF SECTION 7604 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In plain language, Section 7604 directs federal District Court judges to issue orders, merely upon a request by the IRS, for the immediate arrest and incarceration of a taxpayer "for contempt" for not complying with the demands of an IRS administrative summons/request.

Prior to the 2nd Circuitâ??s recent landmark decision, the common practice of compliant federal judges was to issue such orders, often without an evidentiary hearing or allowing the taxpayer, in an Article III Federal Court, to challenge IRS claims before being subjected to formal enforcement proceedings (liens, levies, wage garnishments, searches, property seizures, etc.). The result has been widespread and egregious abuse of its lawful authority by the IRS, and substantial injury to millions of taxpayers.

"Does the Courtâ??s decision mean that companies do not have to turn over a workerâ??s paycheck to the IRS simply because the IRS demanded it, and banks do not have to turn over to the IRS the contents of someoneâ??s bank account merely because the IRS requested it?" asked Bob Schulz, the plaintiff in the case, and the Chairman of the We The People Foundation for Constitutional Education, Inc.

Schulz asked, "Does this mean that at least in the 2nd Circuit, no individual, no third party (such as an employer or a bank) need worry about being threatened and intimidated by the IRS for refusing to comply with an IRS demand for personal and private property? Isnâ??t the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals stating, in clear language, that without an Article III Federal Court order, the IRS cannot apply force against a taxpayer?

"We would agree, the use of force by the IRS against the person or property of any taxpayer without an evidentiary hearing and formal order issued by an Article III Federal Court, is a direct violation of the Privacy and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution. It appears that the IRS has now been put on notice -- they are not above the law."

In 2003, Schulz, was served several IRS summonses ordering him to produce his books and records. Schulz, as plaintiff, immediately challenged the IRS in District Court on constitutional grounds, claiming that the summonses were issued without any bona fide authority in law and with the sole, deliberate intent to harass and intimidate as a result of the Foundation's high-profile activism questioning the lawful authority of the IRS to impose a direct, un-apportioned tax on labor.

Despite the clear language of an IRS summons which states, "You are hereby summoned and required..." and the threatening language of the federal tax statute at 26 USC 7604 (which governs enforcement of IRS summons), the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has effectively ruled that the language of the Internal Revenue Code, and the administrative and enforcement practices of the IRS and DOJ, must comply with the strict Due Process requirements of the United States Constitution, and that the IRS will not be allowed to continue its practice of serving summonses upon average taxpayers with the intent of intimidating them into compliance.

Naturally, this Appellate decision directly leads to further questions regarding IRS's other day-to-day administrative practices where substantial constitutional "injuries" are, in fact, inflicted routinely upon citizens and businesses in the form of liens, levies, salary garnishments, property seizures, etc. -- all of which are administrative, agency actions taken without any judicial review or court order.

The 2nd Circuitâ??s decision also carries profound implications regarding the Foundationâ??s historic Right-to-Petition Lawsuit now underway in the D.C. Federal District. (We The People, et al v. The United States, et al., Civ. No. 04-0211)

The IRS and DOJ, as defendants in the RTP lawsuit, have recently filed motions asserting that the government has "no obligation" to "listen to" or "respond to" the Peopleâ??s First Amendment Petitions regarding the unlawful administrative and enforcement practices and the systemic abuse of power by the IRS and DOJ.

The 2nd Circuitâ??s recent decision could potentially have a powerful positive effect on the RTP lawsuit, and the Peopleâ??s historic struggle to hold the IRS and our government leaders at every level, accountable to the law.

The Courtâ??s decision in the Schulz case is an historic and courageous first step in restoring constitutional order to the administration and enforcement of our nationâ??s tax laws, and effectively puts the IRS and DOJ on notice that violations of taxpayerâ??s Due Process rights will no longer be tolerated.

To read the Second Circuitâ??s decision, go to

http://www.GiveMeLiberty.org/rtplawsuit ... Jan-05.pdf

To learn about the Right-to-Petition lawsuit and read the RTP legal research, go to:

www.GiveMeLiberty.org/rtplawsuit/InfoCenter.htm

DCrazy wrote:No taxes = no refund check